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OWNERSHIP AS A BASIS FOR SUMMARY JURISDICTION IN
CHAPTER XI ARRANGEMENTS
HERBERT SUSKIN* AND BRADFORD SWING**
Noting the importance of determining whether a bankruptcy
court has summary jurisdiction, the authors point out that, ab-
sent consent, the factors necessary to make this determination
are uncertain. This paper examines the controversy as to whether
possession of disputed property by the debtor is the only suffi-
cient basis to give summary jurisdiction or whether ownership,
apart from possession, will also suffice. The authors examine
the commentators-Collier and Remington-as well as the
case law and pending legislation on the issue. In conclusion, they
recommend the adoption of a "substantial proprietary interest"
test as a standard for summary jurisdiction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When an insolvent debtor commences a chapter XI arrange-
ment,' there often exist conflicting claims to property in which the
* J.D., University of Miami, former Senior Articles & Comments Editor, University oif
Miami Law Review.
** J.D., University of Miami, former Managing Editor, University of Miami Lao'
Review; Associated with Blackwell, Walker, Gray, Powers, Flick & Hoehl, Miami, Florida.
1. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-99 (1970). Chapter XI contemplates the creation
of an "arrangement" which is defined as any plan of a debtor for the settlement, satisfaction,
or extension of the time of payment of his unsecured debts, upon any terms. It proceeds as
an offer by the debtor in the form of a petition proposing such an "arrangement," and while
it is not a proceeding for adjudication as a bankrupt (as in straight bankruptcy), it is still
considered a bankruptcy proceeding. The object of the proceeding is the payment of the
debtor's unsecured creditors in an orderly manner and the continuation, if possible, of his
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debtor has some interest. The resolution of these conflicts must be
decided in a plenary suit unless the bankruptcy court exercises its
summary jurisdiction over the conflict. Summary jurisdiction is, for
the most part, the only type of jurisdiction a bankruptcy court
possesses. If summary jurisdiction is lacking or a plenary suit is
necessary, the case has to proceed elsewhere, such as in federal
district court or perhaps in a state forum.'
Whether the bankruptcy court may exercise summary jurisdic-
tion over a particular conflict is thus a significant question since it
determines whether a separate suit, with its attendant delay and
expense, is necessary. ' But there are other factors which may also
cause a party to assert or deny the bankruptcy court's summary
jurisdiction.'
For example, it has been suggested that bankruptcy judges are
more prone to be collection-minded and will attempt to enlarge the
bankrupt's estate. ' This may occur, in part, as a function of the
bankruptcy judge's role as an administrative advisor to the trustee.
In that capacity, he may, prior to their formal presentation to him,
hear statements and see evidence concerning issues which he must
later decide.' Although the existence of any substantial prejudice in
favor of the debtor has been vigorously disputed, and regardless of
the actual existence or non-existence of bias, the perception of such
bias in the eyes of some might induce a creditor to seek, in a plenary
suit, adjudication of his claim to property also claimed by the bank-
rupt.7
Another factor involves the right to a jury trial. Some believe
that the imposition of summary jurisdiction acts to deprive parties
of their constitutional right to a jury trial under the seventh amend-
business. It is thus a more economical proceeding than the straight bankruptcy which in-
volves liquidation of assets. 8B C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 743 (1963).
The arrangement looks toward the creation of a feasible plan whereby the overburdened
debtor may, through the creditor's cooperation, secure a scaling of debt or interest, or an
extension of the due date. If none of these objects can be accomplished, the case is then one
for liquidation through bankruptcy proceedings. In re Sterba, 74 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1935).
2. Treister, Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: Is It Too Summary? 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 78, 78-79
(1966). A bankruptcy court can exercise plenary jurisdiction in limited circumstances in
actions under sections 60, 67, and 70 of the Act. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3.01(2) (14th ed.
1976) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
3. The Supreme Court has recognized repeatedly that plenary processes are "slower and
more expensive" than summary proceedings. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 329 (1966);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Bray, 225 U.S. 205, 218 (1912); Wiswall v. Campbell,
93 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1876).
4. See D. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 836 (1963).
5. J. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 205 at 226 (1956).
6. Id. at 196-97.
7. See Treister, supra note 2.
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ment.' Although generally there ig no constitutional right to a jury
trial in bankruptcy proceedings because they are essentially equita-
ble in nature,9 and neither the Bankruptcy Act nor the Bankruptcy
Rules expressly grant the right to jury trials on the issues of insol-
vency and acts of bankruptcy,"' some may contend that the depriva-
tion of any jury trial right is the most serious drawback to the
summary jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court and that constitutional
protections are of greater importance than more efficient
bankruptcy administration. I Others, however, question the value of
jury trials in civil litigation, believing that juries often "distort" or
"fudge" the facts they are supposed to find and, in addition, often
"determine, not the 'facts', but the respective legal rights. . . of the
parties to the suit."' 2 In any event, it is conceivable that the desire
of a creditor to have his claim heard by a jury might lead him to
challenge the bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction of a contro-
versy.
Procedural factors also affect the desirability of summary as
opposed to plenary adjudication. The view exists that the invoca-
tion of summary jurisdiction means "summary disposition" of a
claim without the protections and opportunity for full presentation
of argument which exists in a plenary suit.'" This view, however, has
provoked persuasive criticism," and is even less forceful in light of
the rules of procedure governing bankruptcy proceedings.' Still,
8. Note, Implied Consent to Summary Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy: The Forgotten Right
to Jury Trial, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 256 (1965).
9. Bankruptcy Act § 2(a), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1970); see Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,
304 (1939); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934); 2 COLLIER 19.07.
10. Bankruptcy Act § 19(a), 11 U.S.C. § 42(a) (1970); see Bankruptcy Rules 115(b),
(409)(c). See also In re Swope, 466 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973)
(no right to jury trial to determine dischargeability).
11. Note, supra note 8, at 265.
12. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 111 (1949); see 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.02 [11
(2d ed. 1948). See generally Palmer, On Trial: The Jury Trial, 20 F.R.D. 65, 71 (1957).
13. See In re Fox Metal Indus., Inc., 453 F.2d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir. 1972); Suhl v. Bumb,
348 F.2d 869, 871 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 938 (1965).
14. See Treister, supra note 2.
15. See 8 COLLIER 3.01131. Pursuant to enabling legislation enacted by Congress, 28
U.S.C. § 2075 (1970), the Supreme Court prescribed Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure govern-
ing straight bankruptcy cases and wage earners' proceedings under chapter XIII. 411 U.S.
989 (1973). The Rules of Bankruptcy became effective on October 1, 1973, and were followed
by the similar rules effective July 1, 1974, governing practice and procedure in chapter XI
cases. Butler, Proceedings Under Chapter XI of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 11 GA. ST. B.J.
220 (1975). For discussion of these rules, see Treister, New Rules for Cases Under Chapter
XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 382 (1974); Landers, The New Bankruptcy Rules:
Relics of the Past as Fixtures of the Future, 57 MINN. L. REv. 827 (1973); Treister, The New
Bankruptcy Rules, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 522 (1973). Similar rules have recently been promulgated
for chapter X proceedings. See Treister, New Rules for Corporate Reorganizations Under
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 377 (1975).
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this might induce a creditor to seek adjudication in a plenary suit.
Finally, it has been asserted that a frequent reason for objection
to summary jurisdiction by creditors is a desire to use the threat of
a costly and time-conguming plenary action to exact more favorable
settlement terms from a debtor struggling to keep his financial
being alive."
Despite the many factors that may cause a party to assert or
deny summary jurisdiction in a chapter XI proceeding, the criteria
for determining the existence of that summary jurisdiction in a
chapter XI proceeding are, at present, uncertain. 7 Although it is
well settled that consent may be the basis for summary jurisdic-
tion,'" Remington'" seems to indicate that mere possession-actual
or constructive2 -of the disputed property by the debtor"' at the
time of filing the chapter XI petition is the only sufficient basis to
give the bankruptcy court summary jurisdiction, while Collier22
unequivocally maintains that in addition to consent and possession,
ownership of the property by the debtor confers summary juris-
diction. The case law is confused.23
It will be the purpose of this comment to examine this posses-
sion/ownership controversy as it exists both among the commenta-
tors and in the courts, and to offer suggestions leading to its ulti-
mate resolution. 4 The last section of the comment will discuss the
ramifications of pending legislation on this controversy.
16. D. COWANS, supra note 4, § 836 (1963).
17. See Comment, Summary Jurisdiction Under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act:
Collier v. Remington, 59 GEo. L.J. 1395 (1971). Both the Georgetown comment and this
comment entertain the same issues; the former was drawn upon for much of the information
used in this comment's introduction. This comment, however, updates and elaborates upon
the case discussion found in the prior comment and differs significantly in its analysis of
policy and in its conclusions.
18. Id. at 1398 n.24.
19. 9 REMINGTON ON BANKRUPTCY § 3574 (6th ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as REMINGTON1.
20. Examples of constructive possession include: "[Wihere the property is in the hands
of the bankrupt's agent or bailee; where the property is held by some other person who makes
no claim to it; and where the property is held by one who makes a claim, but the claim is
colorable only." TaubeI-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 433 (1924) (footnotes
omitted). See also Strasheim, Fundamentals of Summary Jurisdiction in Straight Bank-
ruptcv Over Controversies Between Trustees and Third Persons, 51 NEB. L. REV. 505, 516
(1972).
21. In straight bankruptcy situations all non-exempt property of the debtor passes to the
trustee upon adjudication of bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970). Thus, in most cases,
possession by the trustee will exist where possession by the debtor exists.
22. 8 COLLIER 3.02.
23. See Part III, CASE LAw, infra.
24. The legislative history is inconclusive on the issue and has been discussed elsewhere.
See Comment, supra note 17.
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II. COMMENTATORS
A. Collier
Collier acknowledges the well settled case law that where a
third party in "straight" bankruptcy under chapters I through VII
has actual possession of the property involved and asserts a substan-
tial adverse claim thereto, the bankruptcy court does not acquire
summary jurisdiction over a controversy with respect to that prop-
erty, even though ownership of the property is in the bankrupt.2"
Collier maintains, however, that by virtue of section 31126 of chapter
XI, which has no counterpart in chapters I through VII, a chapter
XI court has enlarged summary jurisdiction resting on ownership of
property, as distinguished from possession." The existence of this
ownership basis does not deny the validity of the separate possession
basis, but is merely an alternate ground for summary jurisdiction."6
Section 311 confers jurisdiction based on ownership and section
30229 confers possession jurisdiction.
Collier's conclusion as to the ownership theory for summary
jurisdiction does not appear to be based on existing case law. This
is understandable given the confusion which exists in the courts.:"
Rather, it appears Collier has taken an affirmative stand based on
statutory language rather than on any particular decisions, and then
footnoted to selected cases for purposes of qualifying his major the-
sis. Conspicuously absent from Collier's treatment is any significant
discussion of policy. In any event, it is noteworthy that Collier de-
25. 8 COLLIER 3.02 n.4 and accompanying text; see Strasheim, supra note 20, at 516.
26. 11 U.S.C. § 711 (1970): "Where not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter,
the court in which the petition is filed shall, for the purposes of this chapter, have exclusive
jurisdiction of the debtor and his property, wherever located."
27. 8 COLUER 3.02 n.2 and accompanying text. Collier also recognizes section 311 as
enlarging the territorial jurisdiction of a chapter XI court. Id. at 3.03.
28. The ownership referred to by Collier must be of a beneficial nature. Thus, "bare legal
title" or property held by the debtor as fiduciary would not be within Collier's concept of
ownership. 8 COLLIER 3.02 n.2.
Collier also maintains that where a third party in possession claims ownership of the
property, the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction in the first instance to determine if the
adverse claim of ownership is substantial or merely colorable. If the claim is found to be
substantial, the bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to hear the merits. But if the claim
is merely colorable, summary jurisdiction exists. This method of preliminary determination
of the substantiality of an adverse claim of ownership is identical to the procedure utilized
in determining the existence of summary jurisdiction based on possession. 8 COLLIER 3.02
n.13 and accompanying text.
29. Section 302 in relevant part makes the jurisdictional grounds of straight bankruptcy
applicable in chapter X1 proceedings.
30. See Part II, CASE LAW, infra.
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votes an entire subsection to this issue and takes an expressly rea-
soned stand.
B. Remington
Remington's position is much less forcefully propounded than
Collier's. The only direct commentary on the ownership/possession
issue offered is as follows:
It is well settled that jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court in ordi-
nary bankruptcy proceedings does not extend to property which,
although asserted by some of those in interest to belong to the
bankrupt and his estate, is, at the time of institution of the pro-
ceedings, in possession of one claiming it adversely. This princi-
ple seems now to apply with full force to arrangement proceedings
under chapter XI .... 1,
Remington makes no mention of section 311 in his discussion of the
scope of summary jurisdiction. He does, however, indicate else-
where" that section 311 serves to enlarge a chapter XI court's
territorial jurisdiction. But the language used does not indicate this
is the only enlargement which section 311 effects. Given Reming-
ton's separate treatment of section 311 and the use of non-exclusive
language in his treatise, it seems likely that Remington never fully
considered, let alone rejected, the theory that section 311 might
enlarge a chapter XI court's summary jurisdiction.
As for the brief indication, quoted above, that possession and
not ownership may confer summary jurisdiction, Remington relies :':,
on two cases. The first, Sada Yoshinuma v. Oberdorfer Insurance
Agency,3" raised the question of whether a chapter XI court could
require a state court receiver, appointed more than 4 months prior
to the initiation of the chapter XI proceedings, to turn over to the
bankruptcy court certain property in the receiver's possession. The
bankrupt argued that under section 311 the bankruptcy court had
such jurisdiction. But the court held that while normally that would
31. 9 REMINGTON § 3574 (emphasis added). Although section 3573 has also been cited as
a relevant section (In re Stockman Dev. Co., 447 F.2d 387, 390 (9th Cir. 1971) and Wikle v.
Country Life Ins. Co., 423 F.2d 151, 153 (9th Cir. 1970)), its relevance apparently is based on
its discussion of Lockhart v. Garden City Bank and Trust Co., 116 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1940),
which does not seem particularly on point as it concerns property subject to a secured lien
but not adversely held until after institution of the proceeding. See note 77 infra, and accom-
panying text.
32. 9 REMINGTON § 3572.
33. This "reliance" is also not forcefully asserted. In citing case authority the footnote
is prefaced with the phrase: "Apparently to this effect .... " 9 REMINGTON § 3574 n.6.
34. 136 F.2d 460 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 785 (1943).
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be true, under section 2a(21)"5 of the Bankruptcy Act, in this partic-
ular circumstance, the bankruptcy court could not issue the turn-
over order. Section 2a(21) provides for the continued control of
assets by non-Bankruptcy Act receivers appointed more than 4
months before the filing of a bankruptcy petition. It should be
noted, however, that section 2a(21) conflicts with section 31136 and
therefore under section 30211 it arguably should not have been ap-
plied to chapter XI proceedings. This point was not discussed in the
case. It has also been suggested that Oberdorfer is primarily a con-
struction of section 2a(21) rather than section 31111 since the court
did not focus its attention on what could be done under section 311,
but merely on what could not be done under section 2a(21). Thus,
Oberdorfer is tenuous authority for denying that a debtor's owner-
ship of controverted property is a sufficient ground for a chapter XI
court's exercise of summary jurisdiction.
The second case on which Remington relies is In re California
Paving Co."5 In that case, the court held that the same jurisdictional
criteria should apply in chapter XI proceedings as in ordinary bank-
ruptcy.' The court based this holding on section 352 of the Act"
which indicates that where not inconsistent with provisions of chap-
ter XI, the rights, duties, and liabilities of creditors and of all other
persons with respect to property of the debtor, shall be the same as
in ordinary bankruptcy. But section 352 purports to deal with provi-
sions concerning "rights, duties and liabilities of creditors" and not
jurisdictional provisions of straight bankruptcy. Perhaps, in this
regard, the court could more appropriately have relied on section
302.42 Its failure to make this distinction, or even to cite section 302
as an alternative, detracts from the persuasiveness of this case as
35. 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(21) (1970).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 711 (1970) subjects all property of the debtor, wherever located, to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the court. It is inconsistent with this provision that the control of
the bankrupt's assets should remain with a non-Bankruptcy Act receiver.
37. 11 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). This section states in relevant part: "The provisions of
chapters 1 to 7 of this title shall, insofar as they are not inconsistent -with or in conflict with
the provisions of this chapter, apply in proceedings under this chapter." Id. (emphasis
added).
38. Comment, supra note 17, at 1403 n.44.
39. 95 F. Supp. 909 (N.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd sub nor., California Paving Co. v. Smith,
193 F.2d 647 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 957 (1952).
40. In ordinary bankruptcy proceedings all property in the actual or constructive posses-
sion of the bankrupt when the petition is filed vests in the trustee and becomes subject to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Id. at 911, citing Thompson v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1939).
41. 11 U.S.C. § 752 (1970).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
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authority. But at least as significant in questioning the authority of
California Paving is the fact that section 352, like section 302, con-
tains a caveat that it is not applicable when in conflict with other
specific provisions of chapter XI. It is suggested that section 311 is
such a conflicting provision."3 The California Paving case makes no
mention of section 311. Finally, and most significantly, the Ninth
Circuit has reversed its California Paving position in subsequent
decisions."
Further analyzing Remington's position, it should be recog-
nized that the last Remington text was published in 1955, prior to
the existence of a fully matured ownership/possession conflict
among commentators or courts. However, in Remington's pocket
part update there is no textual material affirming a view that pos-
session and not ownership may confer summary jurisdiction. In-
deed, there is merely a survey of recent cases on point with decisions
apparently going both ways.
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is suggested that Remington
is improperly viewed45 as conflicting with Collier by advocating a
"possession only" test.4" It is further suggested that reliance on
Remington's textual work for a statement of the applicable law
must be limited by the cases which are cited.
III. CASE LAW
The plethora of cases involving summary jurisdiction generally
in chapter XI proceedings are of such diverse factual patterns and
involve so many alternate theories that reference to the bulk of them
would not be helpful to a comprehensible analysis of the narrow
question at hand. Nonetheless, there are a fair number of cases
which perceive the conflict between ownership and possession as a
basis for summary jurisdiction and sufficientiy discuss the question
to warrant consideration. 7
Following the California Paving and Oberdorfer decisions, the
Second Circuit had occasion to consider the ownership/possession
43. See Comment, supra note 17, at 1401.
44. See In re Stockman Dev. Co., 447 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1971); Pasadena Inv. Co. v.
Weaver, 376 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1967); Lloyd v. Stewart & Nuss, Inc., 327 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.
1964). But the Ninth Circuit has also indicated subsequent to California Paving that its
decision in that case, if not its reasoning, was correct. See Wikle v. Country Life Ins. Co.,
423 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1970); Kapelus v. A Joint Venture. 377 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1967).
45. See generally Comment, supra note 17 for the view that Remington advocates a
"possession only" test.
46. See discussion of In re Stockman Dev. Co., 447 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 923 (1972) in text accompanying notes 83-87 infra.
47. Several of these cases are also discussed in Comment, supra note 17,
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question in Slenderella Systems of Berkeley v. Pacific Telephone &
Telegraph Co.4" The general fact pattern of that case is similar to
many chapter XI arrangements." The debtor was delinquent in
paying his phone bill. He entered a chapter XI proceeding and the
phone company attempted to coerce payment by threatening to
change the debtor's well established business phone number. The
debtor objected to this action by the phone company and sought to
have the issue resolved by the bankruptcy court. The threshold
question, however, was whether the bankruptcy court had summary
jurisdiction to resolve the issue. The Second Circuit in Slenderella
prefaced its discussion of the particular facts of the case with a
statement which mirrors Collier's view:
Although the debtor's undisputed title to property not in his
possession would be enough under the language of Section 311 to
authorize the court to act summarily, the court does not acquire
summary jurisdiction if the property does not belong to the
debtor and is not in his possession, or if the title to property not
in his possession is disputed by a substantial adverse claim."
Reliance for the above statement, however, was placed on two older
cases, neither of which expressly deals with the ownership/
possession conflict."
The court held that the telephone numbers were not "property
48. 286 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1961).
49. See cases cited in In re Kassuba, 396 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
50. 286 F.2d at 490.
51. The first case, In re Adolf Gobel, Inc., 80 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1936), arose under section
77B, the predecessor of chapter X. The case dealt with a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to
enjoin a state court action involving property of the debtor. The Second Circuit indicated that
by virtue of language in section 77B identical to that of current section 311, the bankruptcy
court had jurisdiction to enjoin
not only actions interfering with the property of the debtor which was within the
actual or constructive possession of the debtor on the date of the approval of the
petition, but also actions interfering with property of the debtor not in such
possession, the continued prosecution of which would prevent or impede reorgani-
zation.
Id. at 852.
It should be noted that the above language concerned a reorganization under the prede-
cessor of chapter X and not a chapter XI arrangement. It seems that courts have generally
construed a chapter X court's jurisdiction to be somewhat broader than that of a chapter XI
court. See note 144 infra. More significant, however, is the Gobel court's recognition of
jurisdictional limits defined by the purpose of the reorganization. It is precisely this type of
policy consideration which is absent in the great majority of cases dealing with summary
jurisdiction. Ultimately, the court found that the "property involved ... was not only in no
sense in the debtor's possession, but it was not the debtor's property." Id. at 852.
The second case, In re Journal-News Corp., 193 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1951), is a four sentence
decision:
An arrangement under Chapter XI affects only the unsecured creditors of the
19771
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of the debtor,"52 nor were the numbers in the debtor's possession."
The debtor had contended that its contract rights to continued serv-
ice amounted to property within the meaning of section 311. The
court, somewhat opaquely, responded to this argument by reiterat-
ing that ownership-based jurisdiction is defeated by a substantial
adverse claim to title. It seems the court viewed the phone com-
pany's denial of an enforceable contract right in the debtor to be
equivalent to an adverse claim to the ownership of the debtor's
contract rights. An alternative, and perhaps sounder analysis,
would be that the contract rights of the debtor, regardless of how
enforceable or valid they might be, are nonetheless the debtor's
property, and the phone company was not asserting an adverse
claim to ownership of those rights but was merely denying their
effectiveness. Thus reasoned, the court could have sustained sum-
mary jurisdiction."
The next case to address the ownership/possession question was
Lloyd v. Stewart & Nuss, Inc.5 There, the state's Department of
debtor. The bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and his
property. But the debtor has no property interest in the shares of its stock owned
by its stockholders. Consequently the court had no jurisdiction to restrain dis-
posal of their stock. (citations omitted).
The apparent significance of Journal-News to the Slenderella court was that it cited the Gobel
case, thus extending the rationale of Gobel to a chapter XI case. It may also be argued,
however, that Gobel was cited merely for the proposition that a corporation has no sufficient
property interest in shares of its stock owned by its stockholders.
52. This holding was based on rules and regulations of the phone company which were
part of the contract for service between the phone company and the debtor and which pro-
vided: "The subscriber has no proprietary right in the number." 286 F.2d 488, 490 (2d Cir.
1961). But see In re Fountainebleau Hotel Corp., 508 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1975), discussed infra
note 54.
53. The court considered the debtor's interest in the specific numbers to be a "license"
not amounting to the requisite possession. 286 F.2d 488, 490 (2d Cir. 1961). Contra, In re
Kassuba, 396 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. I1. 1975) and cases cited therein.
54. Other courts have found summary jurisdiction to exist, although utilizing different
logic, in similar cases. In re Fountainebleau Hotel Corp., 508 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1975)
involved a fact pattern substantially similar to that in Slenderella, although the case arose
in a chapter X proceeding and did not discuss the possible ownership basis of summary
jurisdiction. The court in rejecting the holding of Slenderella, reasoned that the rules and
regulations of the phone company should not determine the existence of property rights for
purposes of establishing federal jurisdiction; that in fact specific telephone numbers are
property; and that the debtor's "right of use" established his possession of that property.
Worthy of note is the Fifth Circuit's statement that "the purpose of summary jurisdiction is
to give the bankruptcy court a quick means of preserving the wherewithal for maintaining
the debtor's business. Protecting use of the telephone numbers by the debtor clearly falls
within that responsibility." Id. at 1059. See also 101 Plating Corp. v. The Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co., Public Utilities Comm'n of Cal., Case No. 9313, Decision No. 83824 (Dec. 17, 1974) cited
in In re Kassuba, 396 F. Supp. 324, 325 (N.D. Ill. 1975). Kassuba adopts the reasoning and
holding of Fountainebleau.
55. 327 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1964).
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Public Works contracted with a general contractor who sub-
contracted with the debtor, already in a chapter XI arrangement,
for certain construction work. The debtor, in turn, sub-contracted
with a trucking company. When the trucking company failed to
receive timely payment, it issued a "stop notice" to the Department
of Public Works (which is a substitute for a mechanic's lien on
public works). Under California law, the Department was then re-
quired to withhold from the general contractor and the debtor funds
otherwise owed for work on the project. The Department of Public
Works claimed no interest in the funds but was a mere stakeholder.
The chapter XI court proposed to determine the trucking company's
and the debtor's respective rights in the fund, whereupon the truck-
ing company objected to this exercise of summary jurisdiction. The
court first concluded that the scope of summary jurisdiction would
be controlled by section 311.6 Citing both Slenderella and Collier, 7
the court stated that such jurisdiction "includes property not in the
possession of the debtor, where the debtor's title is not in dispute.""6
But the court went on to hold that the debtor had neither undis-
puted ownership nor possession of the property." The court made
no mention of its failure to apply section 311 in In re California
Paving Co.10
In Pasadena Investment Co. v. Weaver,"' a debtor in a chapter
XI proceeding owned a parcel of land which was subject to an out-
standing trust deed in favor of the Pasadena Investment Company.
The debtor sought to have the deed and accompanying note voided
for fraud in the bankruptcy court. The property was in the actual
56. Collier's view is that section 311 merely enlarges the basic jurisdictional provisions
of sections 2a and 23 which are applicable to chapter XI proceedings through section 302.
8 COLLIER 3.01.1, 3.02.
57. 8 COLLIER 3.02.
58. 327 F.2d at 645.
59. The debtor raised the interesting argument that the property to which the stop notice
was directed, and which was actually in question, was not actual funds but rather a chose in
action of the debtor against the Department based on an obligation by the Depart-
ment-which it did not dispute-to pay the general contractor and the debtor for work done.
The debtor claimed that this chose in action was in the debtor's constructive possession. But
the court held that even if the property in question was a chose in action, it was not in the
constructive possession of the debtor since the debt was not held by the Department for the
debtor, but rather for the general contractor; and the trucking company had an equal and
adverse claim upon that debt. Presumably the court would have used the same equal and
adverse claim rationale had the debtor asserted ownership of the chose in action rather than
constructive possession of it. Essentially the Department held a fund of which neither the
debtor, nor the trucking company had undisputed possession or ownership. It was the money
in the fund which both parties were fighting over, not choses in action.
60. 95 F. Supp. 909 (N.D. Cal. 1951). This case is discussed in the text accompanying
notes 39-44 supra.
61. 376 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1967).
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possession of a lessee at the time the debtor originally came into
ownership and continued in such possession throughout the pro-
ceedings. Pasadena Investment Company failed to object to the
bankruptcy court's summary adjudication of its interest in the prop-
erty under the trust deed and this implied consent" was held, on
appeal, to constitute sufficient jurisdictional grounds. The Ninth
Circuit, however, discussed the ownership theory as an alternative
jurisdictional basis. Citing Lloyd v. Stewart & Nuss, Inc.," the court
stated that:
Section 311 of the Act . . . confers exclusive summary jurisdic-
tion to determine controversies concerning property owned by the
debtor, or in the actual or constructive possession of the debtor
or the bankruptcy court. 4
Thus, it reasoned that since the debtor had undisputed ownership
of the property, summary jurisdiction existed on that basis also,
regardless of who had possession."5 As in Lloyd, the Pasadena court
failed to mention its contradictory analysis in California Paving.
The succeeding case on point was Kapelus v. A Joint Venture, "
where a debtor in a chapter XI proceed ing was a joint venturer who
claimed a right in certain realty. Other conflicting claims to the
property existed, and when the bankruptcy court attempted to re-
solve the controversy its jurisdiction was apparently 7 challenged. In
considering the appeal, the Ninth Circuit made two relevant state-
ments. The first was:
[Summary jurisdiction] may only be invoked, however, when
the property in question is in the possession of the bankrupt. It
62. See Comment, supra note 17, at 1398 n.24.
63. 327 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1964).
64. 376 F.2d at 178 (original emphasis).
65. The court, in discussing the alternate ground for jurisdiction, went even further,
holding that the reversionary interest in the land under lease was intangible property and
that the debtor had constructive possession of that property as a function of her ownership
as lessor. For the proposition that possession of intangible property follows ownership, see In
re Rubin, 378 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1967). This reasoning fails to consider whether such construc-
tive possession of the reversion would confer jurisdiction over any aspect of the property other
than the reversion itself. In this regard, section 2a(15) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §
lla(15) (1970), provides in relevant part that jurisdiction exists in straight bankruptcy to
"make such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments, in addition to those specifi-
cally provided for, as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act."
Section 2a(15) would apply to a chapter XI proceeding by virtue of section 302 of the Act, 11
U.S.C. § 702 (1970). It might also be argued that the ownership required to confer jurisdiction
need not be full ownership but merely a substantial ownership interest. See the test proposed
in Part IV, section E, A New Test, infra.
66. 377 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1967).
67. The decision does not discuss any consent issue. Therefore it is assumed that timely
objection was made at the trial level.
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is established that there is no summary jurisdiction where a third
person is in possession of the property under a claim of right.""
This seemingly definitive pronouncement would be obviously too
narrow since by its terms it precludes summary jurisdiction
grounded on ownership or consent. It is suggested that the court was
not ruling out ownership as an alternative jurisdictional base, as has
been elsewhere suggested,"5 but was merely attempting to establish
that a debtor's possession was one possible ground for summary
adjudication and that possession by an adverse third party de-
stroyed such possession-grounded jurisdiction. This interpretation
is supported by the fact that as authority for its above statement
the court cited Suhl v. Bumb,7° a case involving only a determina-
tion of whether, on its facts, constructive possession existed. The
ownership alternative to possession was not even discussed.
The second relevant statement of the Kapelus court was:
While a tougher question is raised where, as here, one party,
appellants, has legal title and the other, appellees, is in actual
possession, it is now clear that a bankruptcy court has summary
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims to all property that is in the
bankrupt's physical possession, notwithstanding the fact that
legal title rests in a third party.7'
In Kapelus the appellants were third party claimants to the dis-
puted realty; the appellee was the debtor. Therefore the "tougher
question" referred to was not the possibility of ownership as a sepa-
rate ground of jurisdiction (since title was not in the debtor), but
whether, if the debtor had possession, outstanding title in another
would destroy possession-grounded jurisdiction. The court, in its
statement above, merely held that it did not. Kapelus makes no
reference to any of the cases previously discussed concerning an
ownership basis for summary jurisdiction.
Wikle v. Country Life Insurance Co." involved the Nevada
Henderson Land Company as the owner of a hospital upon which
there was an outstanding trust deed securing an indebtedness in
favor of Country Life Insurance Company. After encountering finan-
cial difficulty, Nevada Henderson surrendered possession of the
property to a state court receiver, and filed a chapter XI petition
68. 377 F.2d at 816 (emphasis added).
69. See Comment, supra note 17, at 1402 n.41.
70. 348 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1965). Suhl has prompted criticism for its insinuation that
summary proceedings offer something less than a full hearing with adequate opportunity for
presentation of evidence and argument. See Treister, supra note 2.
71. 377 F.2d at 816.
72. 423 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1970).
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which was subsequently converted to a straight bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. Thereafter Country Life realized upon their trust deed by
sale of the property at which it was the purchaser. This resulted in
the debtor's trustee seeking a quiet title adjudication in the bank-
ruptcy court to determine the respective rights in the hospital prop-
erty of Nevada Henderson and Country Life, but the referee ruled
that he lacked summary jurisdiction. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
first held that the state court receiver, not the debtor, had posses-
sion of the property, whereupon the debtor advanced the argument
that ownership was a separate and alternate jurisdictional ground
in chapter XI proceedings. The court, however, found it unnecessary
to decide the question since the debtor had converted its original
chapter XI petition into one of straight bankruptcy. The court did
recognize, however, the apparent rift between Collier and Reming-
ton" and went on to state, in dicta, that case authority favored
Remington's position, citing only Sada Yoshinuma v. Oberdorfer
Insurance Agency,74 Lockhart v. Garden City Bank and Trust Co.,75
and In re California Paving Co.7"
Since Oberdorfer and California Paving were discussed in Part
II supra, it is only necessary to explore Lockhart. In Lockhart a
chattel mortgage on property in the mortgagor's possession was
given to and filed by a creditor to secure an outstanding debt. The
debtor-mortgagor subsequently filed a chapter XI petition where-
upon the mortgagee, without leave of the bankruptcy court, took
possession of the encumbered property. Having possession, the
mortgagee neglected to refile his security interest within 1 year of
the original filing as required by state law. The first issue addressed
by the Second Circuit was whether the mortgagee could take posses-
sion without leave of the bankruptcy court. Citing, among others,
section 311 of the Bankruptcy Act, the court held that leave of court
is necessary for the rightful removal of property from the possession
of the trustee or debtor-in-possession under a chapter XI proceed-
ing. There is nothing in the language or the holding of Lockhart
suggesting that ownership may not provide an alternate jurisdic-
tional base in chapter XI proceedings.77 Although it has been sug-
73. See Part II, COMMENTATORS, supra, for a discussion of Collier's and Remington's
views.
74. 136 F.2d 460 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 320 U.S. 785 (1943).
75. 116 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1940).
76. 95 F. Supp. 909 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
77. The Second Circuit did recognize the authority of the chapter XI court over the
disputed property, but noted that it was in the actual possession of the debtor at the time
the chapter XI petition was filed. Thus it is perhaps merely authority for the existence of a
possession basis for jurisdiction and not for the proposition that jurisdictional grounds are
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gested" that Lockhart supports a view that chapter XI jurisdiction
is identical to that in both straight bankruptcy and chapter X pro-
ceedings, the language of the case which could conceivably be so
construed" seems merely to indicate that possession is one ground
of jurisdiction common to each proceeding. It was not necessary to
comment on whether ownership without possession would also pro-
vide jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Wikle court's contention that
the Lockhart case supports the purported Remington view that own-
ership by the bankrupt party without possession affords no grounds
for summary jurisdiction for a chapter XI bankruptcy court is un-
supported by an actual examination of the holding and reasoning
of the Lockhart case.
The issue of ownership as opposed to possession as a basis for
summary jurisdiction could have been decided in Mithers v.
Barasch,0 but was side-stepped. There, a divorce decree and prop-
erty settlement order were rendered and appeals therefrom were
pending at the time the husband entered a chapter XI proceeding.
A receiver, acting for the debtor-husband, sought in the bankruptcy
court a turnover order, an accounting, and injunctive relief concern-
ing community property which was in the wife's possession by virtue
of the divorce decree and property settlement order. The bank-
ruptcy referee held he had no summary jurisdiction over the prop-
erty. Although the wife was clearly in possession of the property, the
receiver argued that the ownership rights of the husband were suffi-
cient to confer jurisdiction."' The court noted the "seeming disagree-
identical in straight bankruptcy and chapter XI proceedings.
78. See Comment, supra note 17, at 1403 n.44.
79. This language is as follows:
It is settled, both in ordinary bankruptcy . ..and in corporate reorganization
proceedings under old section 77B, that property in the actual or constructive
possession of the bankrupt when the petition is filed vests in the trustee and
becomes subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Except
where inconsistent with other provisions of Chapter XI, all provisions of Chapters
I to VII . . .are applicable to an arrangement proceeding . . . and the court in
which the petition for an arrangement is filed has "exclusive jurisdiction of debtor
and his property, wherever located." The indicated conclusion is, therefore, that
leave of the court is necessary to the rightful removal of property from the posses-
sion of the trustee or debtor-in-possession under an arrangement proceeding.
116 F.2d at 660 (citations omitted).
80. 439 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1971).
81. The receiver appears to have asserted that ownership and not possession is the proper
jurisdictional test in a chapter XI proceeding, thus placing before the court an unnecessarily
extreme position. Existing authority, including Collier and certain of the cases thus far
discussed in this comment, merely support the proposition that ownership is an alternative
test to possession. 8 CouiER 3.02 n.2, 3.03; Pasadena Investment Co. v. Weaver, 376 F.2d
175 (9th Cir. 1967); Lloyd v. Stewart & Nuss, Inc., 327 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1964); Systems of
Berkeley v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 286 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1961). While the severity of the
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ment" in case authority, citing Wikle as well as Lloyd and Pasadena
Investment. However, the court escaped having to resolve the issue
by finding that even if ownership were a basis of summary jurisdic-
tion, the authority so holding qualifies its position by denying sum-
mary jurisdiction where the debtor's ownership is contested by a
substantial adverse claim of ownership.2 Since the court found the
wife's claim to ownership under the divorce decree and settlement
order was substantial and adverse, it concluded that the husband
lacked clear title as well as possession. The court failed to comment
as to whether clear title without possession on the part of the hus-
band would have provided a basis for summary jurisdiction, if it had
existed.
In In re Stockman Development Co. ,3 the debtor's principal
assets were a hotel built upon a leasehold estate and personal prop-
erty within the hotel. As a result of tax delinquency, the hotel prop-
erty was seized and scheduled for sale by the tax collector. There-
after, the debtor filed a chapter XI petition and the tax sale was
temporarily enjoined. American Acceptance Corporation was the
assignee of a conditional vendor of some of the hotel's personal
property, and American filed a petition for reclamation with the
chapter XI court. Subsequently, the chapter XI arrangement was
converted into a straight bankruptcy proceeding. Thereafter, a sec-
ond conditional vendor's assignee, Westinghouse Credit Corpora-
tion, filed a similar petition for reclamation with the bankruptcy
court. At all times, Security Savings and Loan Association was a
receiver's chosen proposition may have contributed to the court's refusal to reach the merits
of the view, the court's method of escaping the question-finding substantial adverse claim
to ownership-would still have been applicable even if ownership were asserted as only an
alternate test.
82. The court cites Pasadena Inv. Co. v. Weaver, 376 F.2d 175, 178 (9th Cir. 1967), and
Lloyd v. Stewart & Nuss, Inc., 327 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1964), from which it quotes: "[The
bankruptcy court] does not acquire summary jurisdiction over property not in the debtor's
possession where the debtor's title to it is disputed by a substantial adverse claim." Collier
is also cited as supportive authority. (The court's reference to Collier at 181-82 is an apparent
miscitation. The proper citation apparently should be to the text preceding note 13, $ 3.02
at 162-63.) Note, however, that Collier goes further than the court by saying that the adverse
claim to ownership must be made by a third party in possession of the property.
The Barasch court also cited Harrison v. Chamberlain, 271 U.S. 191 (1926), which dealt
with the existence of constructive possession for a definition of "substantial adverse claim."
[W]e are of opinion that [an adverse claim] is to be deemed of a substantial
character when the claimant's contention "discloses a contested matter of right,
involving some fair doubt and reasonable room for controversy" . . . in matters
either of fact or law; and is not to be held merely colorable unless the preliminary
inquiry shows it is so unsubstantial and obviously insufficient, either in fact or
law, as to be plainly without color of merit, and a mere pretense.
271 U.S. at 195.
83. 447 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1972).
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secured creditor, holding a trust deed on both the leasehold and
hotel building. Security purchased the debtor's interest in the per-
sonal property at a trustee's sale. Subsequently, the tax collector
gave notice of its intent to sell the personalty within the hotel to
recover the delinquent taxes. Security allowed the personalty to be
sold, whereupon it bid in the outstanding tax liability. Adding to
its ownership began when Security sought the debtor's interest in
the personalty at the prior trustee's sale referred to above. Neverthe-
less, the bankruptcy referee later granted American's and Westing-
house's petitions for reclamation of the personalty which they had
filed earlier. Security appealed this action by the referee, challeng-
ing, among other things, the referee's summary jurisdiction by
claiming that "the summary jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court
extends only to property in the possession84 of the bankrupt at the
time of filing of the petition in that court,"85 and alleging the debtor
was not in possession of the personalty.
The Ninth Circuit noted that Security's argument was the set-
tled law in straight bankruptcy proceedings; but, prefacing its view
that a chapter XI court has enlarged jurisdiction, the court pointed
out that chapter XI has a different purpose from that of ordinary
bankruptcy,88 and that section 311, which has no counterpart in
straight bankruptcy, controls chapter XI jurisdiction. The court was
concerned not only with the ownership/possession issue, but with
the question of whether the ownership sufficient to confer summary
jurisdiction, may be encumbered ownership. Acknowledging that
Collier views section 311 as expanding a chapter XI court's jurisdic-
tion, the opinion interprets Remington as blowing "both hot and
cold on the question of enlarged jurisdiction."87
The only elaboration offered of "hot and cold" is a quote in
Remington from Lockhart v. Garden City Bank and Trust Co."5 to
84. Presumably this argument was not intended to discount the grounds of consent nor
those of constructive possession.
85. 447 F.2d at 389.
86. Chapters I to VII are the provisions under which an estate is administered
for the purpose of liquidation and distribution. Chapter XI on the contrary seeks
an "arrangement" for the settlement or extension of time for payment of unse-
cured debts with protection of the debtor while the arrangement is being carried
out.
447 F.2d at 389. Note that this analysis of the respective proceedings' purposes, to determine
the scope of jurisdiction, was similarly employed in In re Adolph Gobel, Inc., 80 F.2d 849 (2d
Cir. 1936), discussed in note 51 supra.
87. 447 F.2d at 390. This interpretation by the Ninth Circuit lends credence to this
comment's view, expressed previously in the text accompanying note 45 supra, that Reming-
ton should not be considered as advocating a strict possession test.
88. 116 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1940) discussed in the text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
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the effect that although chapter XI arrangements may not alter the
rights of secured creditors, this is not inconsistent with the exclusive
jurisdiction of a chapter XI court over encumbered property. Appar-
ently the quote was offered to support Remington's "hot" or positive
view on enlarged jurisdiction. No example or support of Reming-
ton's "cold" view is suggested. At any rate, the Stockman court
concluded that the language of section 311 could not be more all-
encompagging and that it "must necessarily include property owned
but encumbered." 9 The court also pointed to section 31411 of the Act
- which gives the bankruptcy court authority to protect the
debtor's assets by injunctions and stays of foreclosure proceedings"2
without resort to a possession test - "[als additional evidence that
the chapter XI jurisdiction was not intended to be restricted to a
theory of possession.""2
Having commented on the enlarging effect of section 311, the
Stockman court turned to a consideration of existing case law. Ac-
knowledging that its own decisions in the Ninth Circuit were in
"some disarray,""3 the court examined the cases urged by Security
as supportive of a strict possession test for chapter XI jurisdiction.
It distinguished Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. 4 on the
ground that it arose under section 773 of the Bankruptcy Act, a
railroad reorganization proceeding, rather than chapter XI, and
that it failed to discuss the effect of section 311. Although one might
wonder why a railroad reorganization court would have any occasion
to refer to section 311, a chapter XI provision, section 77(a), con-
tains language identical to the relevant portion of section 311. In
this regard, the fact that the Thompson court did not cite this
language could be taken as indicative of their view that the language
effected no change in jurisdiction, but it is more likely that the court
was not considering its effect in their decision. In any event, it is
suggested that Thompson can be more persuasively distinguished
89. 447 F.2d at 390.
90. 11 U.S.C. § 714 (1970).
91. Note that the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, enacted subsequent to the decision
in Stockman, do the same. See Bankruptcy Rule 601 as to straight bankruptcy and Bank-
ruptcy Rule 11-44(a) as to chapter XI proceedings.
92. 447 F.2d at 390.
93. Id.
94. 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
95. 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
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than it was by the Ninth Circuit."
96. Indeed Thompson must at least be more closely scrutinized in view of the reliance
other courts place upon it. E.g., Bayview Estates Inc. v. Bayview Estates Mobile Home-
owner's Ass'n, 508 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1974).
In Thompson valuable oil deposits, discovered under a railroad right of way, were at
issue. The debtor railroad, undergoing a section 77 reorganization, claimed that it had fee
simple ownership of the surface along the right of way and thus a right to possession of the
underlying oil. The respondents claimed that although the railroad had possession of the
surface, it was only by virtue of a mere right of way, not fee simple ownership, and that the
fee to the surface and corresponding right to possession of the underlying oil was in the
respondent's lessor who had leased the oil rights to the respondents. The debtor sought,
among other things, a determination in the bankruptcy court of the parties' respective rights
in the oil. The bankruptcy court found that the trustee was in actual possession of the oil
under a claim of ownership and therefore the court had jurisdiction to determine the contro-
versy.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that no one had possession of the
"fugitive oil" but that ownership of the surface would confer rights of possession and use of
the underlying oil. 309 U.S. at 482. Therefore, the Court reasoned, the controversy over the
oil could be resolved by determining who had title to the surface. The Court then found that
since the debtor was in possession of the surface, the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to
adjudicate ownership of the surface.
As a preface to this reasoning, the Court made its often quoted statement:
Bankruptcy courts have summary jurisdiction to adjudicate controversies relating
to property over which they have actual or constructive possession. And the test
of this jurisdiction is not title in but possession by the bankrupt at the time of
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
309 U.S. at 481.
It is suggested that the purpose of the above statement was not to disallow ownership as
an alternate ground of jurisdiction, but to point out that the possession of the oil was not a
function of title to the oil. Perhaps the real meaning of the statement is that title need not
exist in the debtor together with possession; that possession alone is sufficient to confer
summary jurisdiction. This view may be supported in several ways.
First, the question of ownership as an alternate jurisdictional ground was not before the
Court. Indeed, the question before the Court was only one of possession of the oil, and the
above quotation speaks directly to that question. Had the Thompson court wished to pass
upon the larger question of ownership as an alternate ground, it could have mentioned the
language of section 77(a) corresponding to that of section 311. Even if the court were deciding
the ownership issue, how much weight could be given to a decision which fails to consider
the section 311 type language contained in section 77(a)?
Secondly, the citation following the quoted material was to Harris v. Avery Brundage
Co., 305 U.S. 160, 162-63 & nn.4-6 (1938). The facts in Harris disclosed that ownership was
not asserted as a separate ground of jurisdiction nor was it discussed by the court. The cited
portion of the holding in Harris was merely to the effect that bankruptcy jurisdiction "extends
to the determination of controversies relating to all property in the debtor's physical posses-
sion or in the hands of the debtor's agent at the time of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy."
305 U.S. at 163 (original emphasis). Harris was apparently cited only to support the existence
of possession-based jurisdiction. There is no reference whatever in the cited portion of the
Harris opinion which even mentions title or ownership.
Thirdly, many courts have properly cited Thompson for the singular proposition that
title in the debtor is not necessary for summary jurisdiction to exist if the debtor has posses-
sion of the property. In re Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 508 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1975), citing
the exact language of Thompson set out above, interpreted it thusly: "For the bankruptcy
court to have summary jurisdiction, the debtor or his trustee must have possession, construc-
tive or actual, of the property in question. He need not, however, have title to the property."
Id. at 1058. In re Kassuba, 396 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. 11. 1975), construed the identical language
and stated: "It is clear that, as used in the Bankruptcy Act, "property of the debtor" includes
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After dealing with Thompson, the Stockman court distin-
guished Kapelus v. A Joint Venture 7 and Suhl v. Bumb55 on the
grounds that they both relied upon Thompson and that neither
discussed the "enlarging" effect of section 311.11 Neither case ad-
dressed the question of ownership as an alternative jurisdictional
ground. Thus, the language of each case involving the scope of juris-
diction'"" should properly be viewed as emphasizing the requirement
of possession where neither consent nor ownership is asserted as a
jurisdictional basis and not excluding the alternate ground of owner-
ship.
The Stockman court then noted that:
[M]ore recent opinions have held to the view that Section 311
confers exclusive summary jurisdiction, ". . . to determine con-
troversies with respect to property owned by the debtor or in the
actual or constructive possession of the debtor or the Bankruptcy
Court." 0'
property of which the debtor has possession, either actual or constructive. It is not limited to
property title to which is in the debtor." Id. at 326. In Kapelus v. A Joint Venture, 377 F.2d
815 (9th Cir. 1967), the court, citing Thompson, stated: "[It is now clear that a bankruptcy
court has summary jurisdiction to adjudicate claims to all property that is in the bankrupt's
physical possession, notwithstanding the fact that legal title rests in a third party. Id. at 816.
See also In re Madden, 388 F. Supp. 47, 50 (D. Idaho 1975), and cases cited therein.
Thus, reliance on Thompson for the proposition that ownership of disputed property by
the debtor at the time of filing a chapter XI arrangement may not be a sufficient jurisdictional
ground is tenuous at best.
97. 377 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1967), discussed in the text accompanying note 66 supra.
98. 348 F.2d 869 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 938 (1965).
99. The Stockman court further distinguished Kaplan v. Guttman, 217 F.2d 481 (9th Cir.
1954), and Evarts v. Eloy Gin Corp., 204 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1953), without explaining how
they were urged as supporting a strict possession test, on the basis that in each an attempt
was being made to invoke the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to resolve conflicts between
third parties not involving the debtor. It seems that since the debtor had sold all its interest
in the personalty to Security, the controversy really was only between third parties and that,
therefore, Kaplan and Evarts would be on point. The Stockman court did not adequately
discuss this question.
100. E.g., "[blut without actual or constructive possession of the property in the hands
of the trustee, summary jurisdiction is not authorized . Suhl v. Bumb, 348 F.2d 869,
872 (9th Cir. 1965) (emphasis omitted).
101. 447 F.2d at 391 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The Stockman court
reaffirmed that ownership jurisdiction is qualified. No summary jurisdiction exists if "title
to it is disputed by a substantial adverse claim." Id. But as pointed out in the first paragraph
of note 82 supra, Collier finds that the adverse claim to ownership must be made by one who
is in possession of the disputed property before qualification applies. Note that under the
facts in Barasch, which stated the same qualification as did Stockman, this difference was
insignificant since the wife (the party making the adverse claim to ownership) was also in
possession. But in Stockman the adverse claimants to ownership, Westinghouse, American,
and Security, were not in possession. Where a debtor claims ownership of property and this
claim is disputed by another also claiming ownership, but possession is in a third party, the
qualification as stated by the Stockman court would bar ownership-based jurisdiction. 447
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Ultimately, however, the Stockman court resolved the case before
it not on grounds of an ownership jurisdictional basis, but by finding
that both the debtor and the tax collector were in joint possession
of the property at the time of the chapter XI filing.' 2
The next relevant case, Ric-Wil Inc. v. First Pennsylvania
Banking and Trust Co., "3 involved the ownership/possession ques-
tion in an interesting procedural context. The debtor, a public util-
ity and related entities which had suffered flood damage, was loaned
F.2d at 391. But under Collier's statement of the qualification, jurisdiction would not be
destroyed unless the party adversely claiming ownership was also in possession. No court
stating the qualification has recognized this apparent conflict with Collier. See also In re
Copeland, 391 F. Supp 134, 140 (D. Del. 1975).
It should be noted that the qualification is a parallel between jurisdiction based on
ownership and jurisdiction based on possession. Constructive possession will not be recog-
nized in the debtor where another party, in possession, holds with a substantial and adverse
claim to the property. But it has been held that where a neutral third party is in possession
and another third party asserts an adverse claim to the property, the debtor still may have
constructive possession. The adverse claim of the non-possessing third party is not enough
to destroy jurisdiction. See Ric-Wil, Inc. v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 352 F. Supp. 782
(E.D. Pa. 1973), and cases cited therein. To destroy constructive possession-based jurisdic-
tion, then, the adverse claimant must also have actual possession. Thus the analogy exists
to ownership-based jurisdiction: actual possession would be required by the adverse claimant
to ownership for the qualification to apply thus destroying jurisdiction. If a non-possessory
third party makes an adverse claim to ownership, it should not be sufficient to destroy
ownership-based jurisdiction.
Assuming that the purpose of recognizing ownership-based jurisdiction is to work a
genuine expansion of bankruptcy court jurisdiction, it should be recognized that by restricting
the application of the qualification, as Collier does, the number of cases in which the qualifi-
cation will destroy jurisdiction is reduced. It could be argued, however, that the qualification,
in any form, need not exist since there is no statutory justification for it. Analogy to the
constructive possession qualification would be inappropriate since, unlike a constructive
possession test, an ownership test is not, by definition, concerned with possession. It seems
that adoption of a Stockman type qualification or Collier's qualification should have no
application to situations where the challenged jurisdiction was based on ownership. Other-
wise ownership theory will be bastardized by mixing in possession theory.
102. The tax collector's possession consisted of his having seized the property and sched-
uled it for tax sale. The debtor's possession consisted of'its actual possession by permission
of the tax collector. From the factual description offered in Stockman it seems that although
the tax collector had possession, it gave possession up to the debtor. The fact that the tax
collector had rights in the property or that the debtor held the property by grace of the tax
collector seems only to cloud the essential fact that the debtor had actual possession. For
discussion of the related problem of who has possession of a debtor's intangible property, the
debtor or the federal government which has served a notice of tax levy on the debtor's
intangible property, see Comment, Possession of a Bankrupt Taxpayer's Intangible Property,
16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 416 (1974).
The Stockman court also implied that consent to jurisdiction existed by stating: "The
jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court was recognized by all." 447 F.2d at 393.
The court failed to take notice of the fact that Westinghouse filed its reclamation petition
after the chapter XI proceeding was converted into a straight bankruptcy proceeding. The
Wikle court used a similar factual circumstance to avoid having to decide the owner-
ship/possession question.
103. 352 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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state reconstruction funds which were placed in an escrow account
pending distribution for repair costs. Thereafter, the debtor filed its
chapter XI petition. The debtor's receiver ordered the escrow funds
disbursed for continuing reconstruction, but apparently Ric-Wil
Corporation, a supplier of reconstruction pipe to the debtor, was, for
some unexplained reason, not scheduled to be fully paid from this
fund. Ric-Wil sought an order in the bankruptcy court enjoining the
disbursal of the escrow funds and a determination of whether it was
entitled to a portion of them. The bankruptcy court denied the
requested injunction and set a date for a hearing on the question of
Ric-Wil's rights in the fund. Ric-Wil then sought an identical in-
junction of disbursal and determination of interest in the fund from
the district court. 04 The debtor argued that the district court had
no jurisdiction to hear this plenary action since the bankruptcy
court had exclusive jurisdiction of the fund pursuant to section 311.
Although the precise issue before the court was really the exclusivity
of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, the district court's opinion
also spoke to the existence of jurisdiction based on ownership. The
court acknowledged section 311 as a relevant jurisdictional provi-
sion and quoted from Collier as to its interpretation:
Section 311 gives the Court in which the [arrangement] petition
is filed "exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor, and his property,
wherever located." That jurisdiction over property rests on own-
ership of property, as distinguished from possession.'"'
After this recognition of the alternate jurisdictional ground of
ownership, however, the court found that the debtor had construc-
tive possession of the property'06 and that Ric-Wil had consented to
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction.'07 Therefore, the district court
found that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction, and that such
jurisdiction was exclusive. It therefore denied Ric-Wil's request for
an injunction and a determination of rights in the property. 08
The following case dealing with the ownership/possession ques-
tion was Bayview Estates, Inc. v. Bayview Estates Mobile Home-
104. Presumably Ric-Wil sought the separate injunction in the district court, rather
than an appeal from the bankruptcy court's denial since no grounds other than abuse of dis-
cretion existed for appeal.,
105. 352 F. Supp. at 786.
106. This constructive possession by the debtor may have been based on a finding that
the bank, as escrow agent, had possession of the funds without asserting a claim to them.
Note, however, that an adverse claim was made by Ric-Wil. Still, in this circumstance, the
court found that constructive possession in the debtor existed. Id. at 787.
107. Consent was found by Ric-Wil in its filing of a claim in bankruptcy. Id. at 787-88.
108. The court did, however, hold that after the bankruptcy court's determination of
rights in the property, that decision could be appealed to the district court. Id. at 788.
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owners Association.'"' There, the corporate developer of a mobile
home park was sued by the homeowners' association of the park for
failure to provide certain services. The homeowners also withheld
payment of rent from the developer, and paid it into an escrow fund.
The developer subsequently filed a chapter XI proceeding wherein
the bankruptcy court sought to determine the rights of the parties
in the escrow fund. The association apparently objected to the
bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction over the property and this
objection was sustained on appeal to the district court. On appeal
to the Sixth Circuit, the court, after citing section 311, stated that:
[T]he bankruptcy court's exercise of summary jurisdiction de-
pends upon a finding that it has possession, either actual or con-
structive, of the property in question. "And the test of this juris-
diction is not title in but possession by the bankrupt at the time
of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy." . . . In the instant
case it is apparent that the bankruptcy court did not have actual
possession of the disputed monies and that if its jurisdiction is
to be upheld it must be upon a theory of constructive posses-
sion."10
Initially, it should be recognized that the foregoing statement
could be interpreted such that ownership-based jurisdiction would
not be prohibited in all cases. Rather, in cases 'where the adverse
claim of a third party needed possession to bar the court's jurisdic-
tion, only possession would be at issue. An ownership theory would
be inapplicable on the facts in Bayview. Furthermore, the owner-
ship ground was apparently not asserted by the debtor; it was cer-
tainly not discussed by the court which failed to cite any of the cases
discussed in the text of this comment or even to indicate that a
conflict appeared to exist on the question.
Even if one views the court's statement as precluding jurisdic-
tion based on ownership, it must be recognized that the court placed
principal reliance for such a view upon Thompson v. Magnolia Pe-
troleum Co.,"' which has been distinguished on this precise point
by the Ninth Circuit,"' and further distinguished elsewhere in this
comment."3 The court ultimately held that the debtor was not in
constructive possession of the property, and therefore the bank-
ruptcy court did not have summary jurisdiction over the fund.
109. 508 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1974).
110. Id. at 407 (citations omitted).
111. 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
112. In re Stockman Dev. Co., 447 F.2d 387, 391 (9th Cir. 1971).
113. See note 96 supra.
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In the recent case of In re Copeland,"4 Mr. Copeland personally
guaranteed a loan made by Pension Benefit to Graphic Production
Co. and the Citizen-News Co. Copeland agreed to post certain stock
as collateral security for his guaranty. Pursuant to an escrow agree-
ment, the Wilmington Trust Co. (WTC) was designated escrow
agent to hold this stock. When the underlying loan was defaulted
upon, Pension Benefit made demands for payment to the corpora-
tion. Payment was not forthcoming and Pension Benefit then de-
manded that Copeland and WTC surrender the escrowed stock.
Shortly thereafter Copeland filed a chapter XI petition. The
escrow agent then delivered the collateral to Pension Benefit, where-
upon the debtor petitioned the bankruptcy court to order Pension
Benefit to turn the collateral over to the debtor."5 Pension Benefit
responded, in part, by denying the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court.
The district court, in passing upon the jurisdictional question,
directly confronted the ownership/possession issue'" and engaged in
a comprehensive survey of existing authority."7 The court acknowl-
edged that the Ninth Circuit tended toward a test that would ex-
pand jurisdiction for chapter XI cases;" 8 that the Second Circuit in
Slenderella adopted such a test and that the Third Circuit had
interpreted language identical to that of section 311 in a manner
consistent with the Collier view."' No reference was made to the
114. 391 F. Supp. 134 (D. Del. 1975).
115. The debtor alleged Pension Benefit's security interest in the stock was neither
attached nor perfected and hence inferior to the debtor's rights in the property. Id. at 138.
116. The facts of the case called for this since the debtor was found to have ownership
but not possession.
117. The court implies that Remington advocates a strict possession test. It is, however,
the view of this Comment that Remington does not "advocate" this position but merely
surveys the decisions of a few early cases. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
118. See In re Stockman Dev. Co., 447 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1971). In fact, however, it
appears that the Stockman court, although on its facts not required to so hold, was firmly
convinced that section 311 enlarged jurisdiction. Section 314 is discussed as "additional
evidence that the Chapter XI jurisdiction was not intended to be restricted to a theory of
possession." Id. at 390.
119. See Slenderella Sys. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 286 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1961). The
Copeland court also cites In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 453 F.2d 520, 522 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972), a railroad reorganization under § 77 of the Act. The Penn Central
court failed to specify the precise basis for its jurisdiction-ownership or possession. It did,
however, characterize the debtor railroad's bank accounts as "property of the debtor" over
which the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction. Somewhat confusingly the court indicated that
the relevant property consisted of choses in action of the debtor against the bank. It would
seem that in reality the relevant property was the money fund itself since rights to the
debtor's "choses in action" concerned no one; the parties were disputing rights to money in
the bank.
The Copeland court also quoted from the Third Circuit's opinion in In re Rubin, 378 F.2d
104, 109 (3d Cir. 1967), to substantiate that the Third Circuit viewed ownership as a suffi-
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Sixth Circuit's ostensibly contradictory view in Bayview Estates,
Inc. v. Bayview Estates Mobile Homeowners Association.
The court also pointed out that rule 11-44(a) provides for
automatic stays of actions pending or commencing against the
debtor or his property after his filing of a chapter XI petition,
without regard to who has possession. But more compelling is the
court's citation of the Advisory Committee's Note to rule 11-44(a)
which unequivocally indicates that the Committee had embraced
the Collier view.
121
Finally, the Copeland court expressly adopted the Collier view
and found on the facts that the debtor had ownership of the col-
lateral, and therefore summary jurisdiction existed.
A brief summary or overview of the foregoing cases reveals the
following facts: Both the Second and Ninth Circuits have adopted
an ownership-based jurisdictional test; there is some indication that
the Sixth Circuit has not; a district court within the Third Circuit
has also adopted an ownership test; the cases which support the
existence of an ownership test generally offer more persuasive au-
thority based on case law and statutory analysis, including consider-
ation of the purposes of chapter XI proceedings; all cases cited for
the proposition that ownership is not an alternate jurisdictional
basis may be in some way distinguished.
IV. ANALYSIS AND POLICY
In attempting to resolve the question of whether an ownership
basis for summary jurisdiction should exist, it is desirable to go
beyond the reported decisions which generally have failed to discuss
adequately the policy factors and the development of criteria for
summary jurisdiction.
A. Historical Roots of the Possession Test
An initial question, the answer to which may prove helpful in
determining whether ownership should be accepted as an alternate
cient jurisdictional base. But this reliance on Rubin was misplaced since there the court
discussed 'ownership only after it found that in the case of intangibles, possession usually
follows ownership. The Rubin court recognized only possession-based jurisdiction discussing
ownership merely to identify possession.
120. See text accompanying notes 109-10 supra.
121. The Committee's Note states, in relevant part: "[Section] 311 gives the court
exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property wherever located and this jurisdictional
grant includes granting stays and injunctions. See 8 COLLIER 3.02 (1963)." COLLIER, BANK-
RuPtcy ACT AND RULES 1156 (Pamphlet ed. 1975). See also text accompanying note 91 supra
for a similar view expressed in Stockman.
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jurisdictional basis, is "How did possession come to be the estab-
lished test for straight bankruptcy jurisdiction?" It should be noted
that none of the provigiong of the Bankruptcy Act dealing with
jurisdiction mention possession. Section 2 of the Act' confers sum-
mary jurisdiction over bankruptcy "proceedings" which are detailed
in some of its subsections. These subsections indicate that "pro-
ceedings" are generally administrative matters, but subsection 7
also confers summary jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court to re-
solve controversies arising in a "proceeding." The Act, in section 23,
describes the subject of plenary jurisdiction as "all controversies at
law and equity, as distinguished from proceedings under this
[Act]. .... "I Thus, the statutory criteria for determining
whether summary jurisdiction exists to resolve a dispute is the de-
termination of whether the particular controversy is one "arising in
a proceeding" or "at law and equity." But these are "terms of art
which mean no more and no less than the courts have said they
mean."'' 4 Courts have made the distinction turn on the concept of
possession. It is submitted that in the development of the possession
test, there was no evidence of a rationale or policy which would be
thwarted by a limited expansion of the possession test.
The earliest case found which relates to the distinction between
a controversy "arising in a proceeding" and one arising "at law or
equity" is In re Kerosene Oil Co.'25 There, a creditor of the bank-
rupt sought in a state court to foreclose a mortgage it held on the
debtor's property. The debtor's trustee 6 petitioned the bank-
ruptcy court to enjoin the state court action and to determine the
validity of the mortgage itself. The mortgagee, however, asserted
that the bankruptcy court had no summary jurisdiction to do so. In
deciding the question on appeal, the court made reference to the
then existing bankruptcy statute.'27 The first section of that Act
provided, in relevant part, that bankruptcy courts will have juris-
diction "in all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy . . . ." The
second section of the Act qualified the first and required plenary
proceedings in "all suits at law or in equity which may or shall be
brought by the [trustee] in bankruptcy against any person claim-
ing an adverse interest, or by such person against such [.trustee],
122. 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1970).
123. Id, § 46.
124. See Strasheim, supra note 20, at 510.
125. 14 Fed. Cas. 380 (1869).
126. At that time the trustee was actually referred to as the debtor's "assignee in bank-
ruptcy."
127. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517.
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touching any property or rights of property of said bankrupt...
Note the similarity of these sections to sections 2 and 23 of the
present Act.' The court found that while the case was generally one
in bankruptcy, and so apparently within the first section, it was
more precisely a case brought by the trustee against one claiming
an adverse interest in the bankrupt's property; and therefore within
the qualification of the second section requiring plenary determina-
tion. There was no discussion of possession, although it appeared
that the debtor had possession of the mortgaged property. The court
did, however, indicate that if summary jurisdiction had been found,
the summary proceedings would be in some way "informal" and
that appeal from them might not lie.'29 Thus, it appears that the
determination of jurisdiction was purely a matter of statutory con-
struction, not involving a possession test, but colored by a view that
summary proceedings would not afford full due process.
In Knight v. Cheney,'30 the trustee of the bankrupt claimed
rights to certain goods which he asserted were fraudulently trans-
ferred to a third party prior to bankruptcy. The third party claimed
valid title to the goods which were in its possession and contended
that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to hear the contro-
versy. The bankruptcy court found that it did have jurisdiction,
whereupon an appeal was taken. The court, on appeal, pointed out
that the language of the first section of the Bankruptcy Act (the
1867 Act) apparently conferred summary jurisdiction, but that ref-
erence was necessary to the second section since the language fit the
facts of the case more precisely and therefore called for plenary
adjudication. The Knight court also viewed summary proceedings
as affording something less than full due process.' 3 ' The court could
have justified its ultimate decision by interpreting the statute to
require plenary suit, as did the Kerosene court. But the court went
further and added that under the facts of the case the goods were
all in the actual possession of the third party claimant and this
factor as well required plenary adjudication.'32 It seems the court
discussed possession only because the trustee also relied on section
25 of the 1867 Act. That section provided, in relevant part, for sale
and retention of proceeds for later distribution by the trustee of
disputed assets which were in the trustee's actual possession or
i28. See text accompanying notes 122-23 supra.
129. The appellate provisions of the Act, contained in section 8, were apparently unclear
as to the rights of appeal from summary proceedings.
130. 14 Fed. Cas. 760 (1871).
131. Id. at 762.
132. Id. at 763.
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claimed by the trustee. The court repeatedly emphasized that nei-
ther the trustee nor the debtor had possession of the goods at the
time bankruptcy was filed. The court reasoned that the phrase, "or
claimed by the trustee" could not mean what it seemed to,'33 for if
it did, a bankruptcy court could sell every piece of property owned
by anyone in its district merely upon a claim by the trustee. Thus,
as a result of the argument surrounding section 25 of the 1867 Act,
possession became a factor in the determination of the necessity for
plenary suit. Although the possession factor was not immediately
relied on as the sole criteria, courts continued to discuss it in subse-
quent cases.
The earliest Supreme Court discussion concerning the determi-
nation of summary jurisdiction appeared in Smith v. Mason.'34 The
debtor and a third party each asserted ownership of a fund held by
a bank. The debtor sought determination of rights in the fund by
the bankruptcy court, whereupon the third party objected to the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to decide the matter. The jurisdic-
tion issue was appealed to the Supreme Court which cited the first
section of the 1867 Bankruptcy Act as well as the second section
which qualified it. The Court found that the facts of the case fell
within the language of the second section. Prior to an express hold-
ing on jurisdiction, however, the Court engaged in a discussion of
possession, pointing out that the debtor did not have possession of
the fund at the time he filed his bankruptcy petition, and that the
third party had made an apparently valid claim to the fund. No
explanation or citation was offered to indicate why possession was
important to the Court. It is submitted that the possession discus-
sion in Mason was prompted by the decision in Knight. In this
respect, it is noteworthy that Justice Clifford, who wrote the Mason
decision, had also authored the Knight opinion. The idea that sum-
mary proceedings did not offer full due process protections and pro-
cedures was common to both opinions. At any rate, immediately
after its discussion of possession, the Mason Court held that no
summary jurisdiction existed, but did so without clearly specifying
whether it decided the case on the basis of the second section of the
1867 Act, or the absence of possession by the debtor, or both.
The case of Marshall v. Knox, "I decided a year and a half later
by the Supreme Court, offers some elaboration. A sheriff, upon re-
133. The court later held that this language referred to property in the actual possession
of the debtor or the debtor's agent, but which was "claimed by the trustee." Id. at 763-64.
134. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 419 (1871).
135. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 551 (1872).
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quest of a lessor, seized goods of the debtor to secure the debtor's
payment of back rent. Subsequently, the debtor filed for bank-
ruptcy and the bankruptcy court attempted to determine the rights
to the goods while they were in the sheriff's possession. The lessor
objected to the court's jurisdiction to make such a determination,
claiming the sheriff held the property as agent for the lessor. In
passing on the existence of summary jurisdiction under these facts,
the Court first cited the second section of the 1867 bankruptcy stat-
ute. It then noted that at the time the debtor filed his bankruptcy
petition, the sheriff had taken possession of the goods and was hold-
ing them for the lessor. Thereafter, the Court referred back to the
second section of the Act and held that the facts before the Court
fell within that section's description of controversies which require
plenary adjudication. The Knox court also suggested that summary
adjudication would not offer "due process of law." It would seem the
existence of jurisdiction was a function of statutory construction
rather than possession. It is true, however that in both Mason and
Knox the court discussed possession, noted that the debtor did not
have possession, and ultimately held that summary jurisdiction did
not exist.
By this time, possession had become inextricably tied to a de-
termination of summary jurisdiction. Although a new Bankruptcy
Act was passed in 1898,136 it continued the distinction of the old
section 1 controversies arising in "proceedings in bankruptcy" and
old section 2 controversies arising "at law or in equity" in the new
sections 2 and 23 respectively. In 1905 the Supreme Court held that
the 1898 Act was framed in recognition of the principles of the old
cases discussed above, and that the Court's decisions concerning the
distinction between proceedings in bankruptcy and plenary suits at
law or equity were applicable to the new Act.'37 The Court went on
to say: "It was settled that the bankruptcy court was without juris-
diction to determine adverse claims to property, not in the posses-
sion of the [trustee] by summary proceedings."' 3
Prior to that decision, but after the enactment of the 1898 Act,
the Supreme Court had decided the case of White v. Schloerb, 3
which involved a debtor who had actual possession of certain prop-
erty at the time he filed his petition in bankruptcy. A creditor had
wrongfully taken possession of the property, and the trustee sought
136. Act July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
137. First Nat'l Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 198 U.S. 280 (1905).
138. Id. at 289.
139. 178 U.S. 542 (1900).
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to have the bankruptcy court order its return. The creditor claimed
the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. The Su-
preme Court, however, held that since the trustee, and thereby the
bankruptcy court, was originally in possession of the property and
since the only issue before the bankruptcy court was a right to
possession of the property pending future determination of owner-
ship rights, the bankruptcy court had summary jurisdiction to order
the creditor to return the property to the bankrupt's estate. Al-
though section 2 of the new Bankruptcy Act was briefly alluded to,
the holding was not clearly based upon an interpretation of statu-
tory language.
Authorities have implied that this case was the origin of the
possession test for the existence of summary jurisdiction. 4 ' If so, it
must be noted that only possession, and not ownership of the prop-
erty was at issue in the bankruptcy court. Given the fact that the
Supreme Court found possession was wrongfully taken from the
bankruptcy court, it is understandable that the Court found that
the bankruptcy court's initial possession was sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon that court to take back the property. Indeed any
court must have the power to protect its own assets. This limited
holding, based on the original possession of the bankruptcy court,
was not intended by the White court to be a comprehensive con-
struction of sections 2 and 23, the jurisdictional provisions of the
1898 Act. It hardly seems likely that the White court would have
wanted its decision to shape the boundaries of summary jurisdiction
in cases where more than possession was sought to be resolved. At
the very least, White doeg not present any persuasive rationale for
adhering to a strict possession based jurisdictional test to be used
in the myriad of cases and factual circumstances which arise in
bankruptcy.
If the possession test is really rooted in cases decided before
White, even stronger grounds exist for not viewing possession as the
only desirable jurisdictional test today. First, the possession test
grew out of cases in which the courts clearly believed that summary
determination would not offer full due process, including in some
instances, the right of appeal. Given this view, it is only natvral that
these courts were reluctant to allow a summary determination of
third party rights in property claimed by the bankrupt. The posses-
sion test afforded at least some restriction on the bankruptcy courts.
Summary proceedings today do offer full due process protections
and opportunity to be heard,' and appeals from summary determi-
140. See 2 COLLIER 23.04 n.14 and accompanying text.
141. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
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nations are permissable.
Second, the possession test was born in a section of an old
bankruptcy statute which no longer exists. If section 25 of the 1867
Act had not been argued in Knight, perhaps courts would have
continued to rely on the actual language of the jurisdictional sec-
tions rather than a simplified possession test to determine if juris-
diction existed in a particular case.
This discussion should not be interpreted as suggesting that the
possession test is entirely incorrect or even undesirable. It has been
used for too long and more importantly, it has worked for too long
to be completely uprooted. It is important, however, to recognize
that the possession test is not so fundamentally rooted in any clear
purpose of any bankruptcy act that it must be followed exclusively.
Furthermore, it is suggested that any departure from a strict posses-
sion test would not be a departure from a well reasoned or purpose-
fully developed doctrine which was intended to serve as the determi-
native criteria for establishing the scope of summary jurisdiction for
all bankruptcy cases.
B. Comparison of Chapters X and XI
Apart from the historical analysis of the roots of the possession
test, it is interesting to note that some courts have made use of
language in section 111 of chapter X,111 which is identical to that of
section 311 of chapter XI,143 to justify enlarged jurisdiction in chap-
ter X proceedings.' In First National Bank v. Lake,"' the court,
citing section 111, held that a chapter X court's summary jurisdic-
tion extended over the debtor's property which was in the possession
of a creditor at the time of reorganization filing to serve as collateral
142. 11 U.S.C. § 511 (1970).
143. Id. § 711.
144. Language substantially identical to that of section 311 is also found in section 77(a)
(railroad reorganizations), section 411 of chapter XII (real property arrangements by persons
other than corporations), and section 611 of chapter XIII (wage earner's plans). There are
relatively few cases which construe the language of these sections in such a way as to shed
any light on the topic of this comment. It is believed that for the purpose of understanding
how section 311 language might be construed, textual reference to the many cases arising in
chapter X proceedings is sufficient.
The "enlarged" jurisdiction in chapter X proceedings has also been justified without
citation to the language of section 111. See, e.g., In re Atlas Sewing Centers, Inc., 384 F.2d
66 (5th Cir. 1967); Pettit v. Olean Indus., Inc., 266 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1959); In re Cuyahoga
Fin. Co., 136 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 1943); In re Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 139 F.2d 149 (3d Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 796 (1944); Warder v. Brady, 115 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1940). But
see Duda v. Sterling Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1949); In re Mountain Forrest Fur
Farms, 122 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1941); In re Prudence Bonds Corp., 75 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1935).
145. 199 F.2d 524, 527 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 914 (1952).
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for the debtor's obligations. In re Muntz TV46 cited both the Lake
case and section 111 for the same proposition. Collier's statement
of the "enlarged" jurisdiction of chapter X courts is also partly
premised on the language of section 111.' 41
Perhaps of greater significance than the mere citation of section
111 is the fact that both Collier and the courts which have construed
section 111 (and other provisions of chapter X) have concluded that
summary jurisdiction is enlarged in chapter X proceedings based in
part on the purposes of that chapter. They have indicated that since
chapter X plans must include provisions affecting secured credi-
tors,'48 it is necessary for the bankruptcy court to have jurisdiction
over property owned by the debtor but which is in the possession of
a creditor who asserts a lien upon it. Thus, it was stated in Warder
v. Brady:'
The formulation of a plan of reorganization contemplates a read-
justment of secured as well as unsecured debts, and so the sum-
mary power of the court extends to all of the debtor's property
that can be affected by a plan, whether or not the property is in
his possession. ,10
In Lake where it was acknowledged that possession of the debtor's
property by a creditor who asserted a lien thereon did not deprive
the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction, it was stated that: "The pur-
pose of Chapter X is to force secured creditors to come into the plan
of reorganization worked out in the reorganization court .... ".'
C. Purpose of Chapter XI
This type of "purpose" analysis seems equally appropriate in
evaluating the desirability of enlarged jurisdiction in chapter XI
proceedings. It is true that chapter XI does not require, or even
permit secured creditors' rights to be affected by the plan of ar-
rangement and thus can be distinguished from the chapter X cases,
but chapter XI nonetheless has certain acknowledged purposes
which would be furthered through an expansion of summary juris-
diction.
The Supreme Court has stated the purpose of chapter XI to be,
"to provide a quick and economical means of facilitating simple
146. 229 F.2d 228, 231 (7th Cir. 1956).
147. See 6 COLLIER 3.03 as to the effect of section 111, and 3.05 as to the enlarged
jurisdiction of chapter X courts.
148. Bankruptcy Act § 216 (1), 11 U.S.C. § 616(1) (1970).
149. 115 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1940).
150. Id. at 95.
151. 199 F.2d at 528.
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compositions among general creditors "....,,,. 2 Other courts have
emphasized that "the purpose of Chapter XI is to provide a rapid,
economical method for rearranging or scaling down . . . unsecured
debts . . and that Congress intended, by its enactment of this
chapter, to provide a means for the preservation of a going business
which otherwise, because of overwhelming debt burden, would dis-
appear from the economic scene.'54 Furthermore, it has been argued
that "the primary advantage of a separate chapter for arrangements
with the debtor's unsecured creditors is economy [and a] plan of
arrangement permits the rescue of a financially troubled business
on simpler terms."'55
It is clear that chapter XI plans were not intended to provide
for dealing with secured creditors. To the extent that an enlarged
jurisdictional scope, based on ownership, would permit such an ef-
fect on secured creditors' rights in summary proceedings, it would
be inconsistent with the purposes of chapter XI. However, many
factual circumstances are conceivable in which ownership-based
summary jurisdiction might exist over property not involving the
claims of secured creditors.'55 An argument can be made i'or allowing
a bankruptcy court to exercise its summary jurisdiction over the
property held by a creditor as a pledge. The summary jurisdiction
would extend only to answering the question of whether there is a
valid "security interest." Such a determination would not impair
the debt or the security of the alleged "secured creditor" since his
status is subject to question.'57
Apart from the secured/unsecured creditor distinction, another
inescapably clear purpose of chapter XI, as gleaned from the pre-
ceding quotations, is to offer a quick and economical method of
keeping an ongoing business in operation.' 5 The advantages of
maintaining a business in operation are manifest. The chances of
maintaining the viability of an ongoing business in hopes of increas-
152. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 606 (1965).
153. In re Peoples Loan and Inv. Co., 410 F.2d 851, 856 (8th Cir. 1969).
154. Meyer v. C.I.R., 383 F.2d 883, 890 (8th Cir. 1967).
155. Drake, The Judges" Bankruptcy Bill and the Commission's Bill: A Question of
Access to the Judicial Process, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1009, 1040 (1975).
156. See, e.g., In re Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 508 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1975); Bayview
Estates Inc. v. Bayview Estates Mobile Homeowners Ass'n, 508 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1974); In
re Barasch, 439 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1971); Loyd v. Stewart & Nuss Inc., 327 F.2d 642 (9th
Cir. 1964); Ric-Wil, Inc. v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 352 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
157. Note that a chapter XI court may summarily determine whether a secured creditor
has been affected by an arrangement. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 308, 11 U.S.C. § 708 (1970).
158. A chapter XI proceeding can also be initiated by an individual. 11 U.S.C. §§ 22,
702 (1970). Many of the reasons which make it desirable to keep ongoing businesses in
operation also apply to keeping solvent individuals solvent.
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ing its financial strength are substantially increased when the time
and expenge required to complete an arrangement are decreased.
Considerable time and expense would be saved if all of a debtor's
controversy could be settled in the bankruptcy court's summary
proceedings without the necessity of separate plenary actions.
Therefore, a limited expansion in the scope of the bankruptcy
court's summary jurisdiction would be in the furtherance of the
previously stated goal of chapter XI, namely, an easy means of
facilitating economic recovery. '9
D. Other Considerations
A further reason for some departure from a strict possession test
is the difficulty encountered in applying such a test to intangible
property of the debtor.10 In cases of intangibles, some courts have
been forced to use the legal fiction of constructive possession which
has begun to increasingly appear as a recognition that some prop-
erty interest other than possession is justification for the courts'
exercise of summary jurisdiction.'' Thus, for example, in In re
Rubin' the debtor in a chapter XI proceeding was in the baked
goods business and employed driver-salesmen who kept appointed
delivery routes and retail vendors. The bankruptcy court attempted
to prohibit the driver-salesmen from individually servicing the retail
vendors, believing the routes to be the property of the debtor. The
court, on appeal, indicated that jurisdiction would be a function of
constructive possession and that "[in the case of intangibles, such
as these routes, constructive possession usually follows owner-
ship." 13
In Walker Manufacturing Co. v. Bloomberg,'4 where the dis-
puted "property" was a secret industrial process, although the court
recognized that "possession" was the accepted test of jurisdiction,
159. The Bankruptcy Act § 311, 11 U.S.C. § 711 (1970), permits the bankruptcy court
to have exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor and his property, wherever located when dealing
with chapter XI arrangements. Although similar logic could be extended to non-arrangement
proceedings, there is no equivalent of § 311 in chapters I to Vii of the Bankruptcy Act
pertaining to straight bankruptcy proceedings. The question of an expanded ownership-based
jurisdiction in such straight bankruptcy proceedings is not an open area of the law. First Nat'l
Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 198 U.S. 280 (1905).
160. See generally 2 COLLIER 23.05[41 at 486-92.
161. See In re Schokbeton Indus., 449 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1971) (franchise or lease agree-
ments); In re Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 13 F. Supp. 601 (N.D. Ill. 1935)(trading rights on an
exchange).
162. 378 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1967).
163. Id. at 109, citing In re Marsters, 101 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied sub nom.
Herman v. Henley, 306 U.S. 663 (1939).
164. 298 F.2d 688 (1st Cir. 1962).
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it confessed that this test was not well suited to cases involving
intangibles. The court ultimately decided, "[i]n essence, the exist-
ence or non-existence of summary jurisdiction reduces itself to the
question of whether the . 'process . . . was owned by and under
the exclusive control of [the debtor] . ' "65
Indeed, it should be noticed that the accepted principle of con-
structive possession often has nothing whatever to do with real pos-
session, but is merely a semantic link with the originally recognized
jurisdictional basis of actual possession. It is submitted that the
existence of a constructive possession doctrine itself is actually a
manifestation of courts' convictions that a debtor may have a suffi-
cient interest in property, entirely apart from possession, to justify
adjudication of controversies over it in a bankruptcy court.
The unsacred nature of the possession test, along with the the-
sis that a more basic debtor interest is what presently underlies
summary jurisdiction, is supported by the fact that wrongful posses-
sion by the debtor is not recognized as grounds for the existence of
summary jurisdiction.'
E. A New Test
If summary jurisdiction is to be expanded,"7 there is need for a
more precise definition of the intended scope of the enlargement
than is offered by existing authority. Collier speaks of ownership as
an alternative to "possession" as a determining factor,"' while
courts generally speak of title. Section 311, upon which the language
of both "ownership" and "title" are based, refers to "property of the
debtor." These general terms may be sufficient to contrast with
"possession," but they do not sufficiently define to what extent
jurisdiction will be expanded. Perhaps this can best be done by the
courts on a case by case basis. Nonetheless, a brief attempt to begin
that process is offered here.
The courts have sought a link between the bankrupt and the
property in controversy when developing a criteria for the establish-
ment of summary jurisdiction. This connection has been necessary
165. Id. at 693 (original emphasis).
166. Bradley v. St. Louis Terminal Warehouse Co., 189 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1951).
167. Any "enlargement" of existing jurisdiction might be merely a formalization of a
process which js already well under way. One commentator has suggested, at least in regard
to the issuance of injunctions against creditors, that the bankruptcy courts have and will find
whatever jurisdiction is required to achieve a desirable result on the particular facts of the
case. See Festersen, Equitable Powers in Bankruptcy Rehabilitations: Protection of the
Debtor and the Doomsday Principle, 46 AM. BANKeR. L.J. 311 (1972).
168. Collier does qualify his position by stating that the ownership must be of a benefi-
cial nature, thus ruling out the bare legal title of a fiduciary. 8 COLLIER 3.02 n.2 at 157.
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to insure that uninvolved third parties will not lose valuable prop-
erty rights without due process. A plenary action would afford them
the requisite due process. Possession was something the courts could
identify as a connection between the property and the bankrupt. It
is suggested that the gravamen of the plethora of cases ostensibly
requiring possession is really a requirement for a "sufficient link."
Thus, an expanded jurisdictional test should have at its foundation
the concept of a "sufficient link," though it must be limited so as
not to supersede the secured creditor limitation previously dis-
cussed. "9 Such a test should also conform to a reasonable construc-
tion of the "property of the debtor" language of section 311.
It is believed the above mentioned foundation requirements are
met if the bankruptcy court is not called upon to impair the rights
of a secured creditor, 7 " and if a debtor has a substantial and bona
fide, not merely colorable, proprietary interest in the property which
is reasonably necessary to the sucsessful formulation, confirmation,
and performance of a plan of arrangement and the subject of a
controversy. 7' The debtor would not need to claim fee simple owner-
ship or record title, but merely some valuable and substantial inter-
est in the subject property. But the debtor's claim must be bona fide
and not merely colorable.72
It should be noted that this proposed "substantial proprietary
interest" test is not qualified, as is Collier's "ownership" test, by
any rule that the "substantial proprietary interest" must be undis-
puted by an adverse claim. It appears the only purpose of such a
qualification would be to insure that the debtor could not bring
controversies into the bankruptcy court which did not actually in-
volve the "property of the debtor." The existence of an "adverse
claim" is what frequently creates the controversy and renders it
beyond the bankruptcy courts' summary jurisdiction. The new test
incorporates this same function by requiring that the debtor have
both a bona fide and substantial interest in the controversial prop-
169. See Part IV, C supra.
170. Note that adjudications can be made which, practically speaking, affect secured
creditors, but which neither impair their security nor reduce the debt owed to them. See In
re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966). Also, as pointed out in the text
following note 156 supra, the mere adjudication of whether a creditor was really "secured"
by passing upon the validity of his security interest need not be considered outside the scope
of the limited chapter XI purposes. For a discussion of the proposition that chapter XI courts
may deal with secured creditors and still be within the scope of jurisdiction intended by
Congress, see Festersen, supra note 167, at 324.
171. For general support of such an enlarged test of jurisdiction, see Drake, supra note
155, at 1011-14.
172. See generally Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U.S. 191 (1926); Thompson v. Duchner,
214 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1954).
[Vol. 31:307
SUMMARY JURISDICTION IN CHAPTER XI
erty. Such a "substantial proprietary interest" test would be a plau-
sible construction of the "property of the debtor" language of sec-
tion 311, and it would be in furtherance of the previously stated
purpose of chapter XI. Such a test would provide the requisite "suf-
ficient link" between the debtor and the third party claimants.
Moreover, it would be more specific than merely "ownership" or
"property of the debtor" while not being rooted to the archaic con-
cept of "title", which has been often criticized as a determiner of
important legal consequences.'
Further elaboration and illustration of the operation of such a
"substantial proprietary interest" test may be provided by exami-
nation of a few of the cases which have discussed the owner-
ship/possession issue. In the "telephone number" cases, typified by
Slenderella Systems v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 7 where
the controversy was whether a telephone company could change the
numbers of a debtor in a chapter XI proceeding, a threshold ques-
tion was whether the phone numbers were property. Although the
Slenderella court held they were not for purposes of section 311,
other courts have disagreed. "5
Assuming such telephone numbers are property, the debtor's
interest in them would arise out of contract and a right to use them.
A right of use is not title or ownership and so would not be within
the jurisdictional expansion suggested by Collier or by some courts.
A right of use could be a "substantial proprietary interest," how-
ever, depending on the particular equities of a given case, including
the necessity of retaining the phone numbers for the successful com-
pletion of a chapter XI arrangement. A bankruptcy court could,
therefore take jurisdiction over this controversy. The contractual
right of the debtor to use a particular number constitutes property,
although intangible.
The Slenderella view, which considers the debtor's property
rights in the contract to be the disputed property, leads to a di-
lemma-while a bankruptcy court might exercise jurisdiction over
the debtor's contract rights, as his property, it could not exercise
jurisdiction over the phone company's contract rights, in which,
technically, the debtor would have no interest.
A sounder approach when dealing with contract rights would be
173. See Comment, supra note 17, at 1407 and cases cited therein.
174. 286 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1961) discussed in text accompanying notes 48-54 supra.
175. E.g., South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Simon, 508 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1975) (telephone
numbers were in the possession of the debtor); Georgia Power Co. v. Security Inv. Properties,
Inc., 406 F. Supp. 628, 635 (N.D. Ga. 1975) ("the right to continued electrical service is an
intangible form of property in the possession of the debtor .... ").
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to consider the contract itself as the property subject to dispute, and
then apply the "substantial proprietary interest" test to determine
if the debtor had a bona fide interest in the contract. Again, the
particular equities of the case would color the decision.
In Loyd v. Stewart & Nuss, Inc., "I where the debtor and a
creditor made ownership claims to money being held in a fund by a
neutral third party, it would appear that under a "substantial pro-
prietary interest" test summary jurisdiction would have existed.
There is a question as to whether the fund was property "reasonably
necessary to the successful formulation, confirmation, and perform-
ance of a plan of arrangement." This is because the claim, indeed
the fund, did not come into existence until over a year after the
confirmation of the debtor's plan of arrangement. Whether the
fund, and proper distribution of it, was a matter "reasonably neces-
sary" to the plan or merely a controversy which happened to arise
during a period when the debtor was working out his plan, would
be an issue to be decided by the bankruptcy court in its discretion.
The bankruptcy court, having a working knowledge of the debtor's
affairs and its plan, would be in a good position to make such a
decision.
The determination of jurisdiction over a specifically segregated
fund leads to the more difficult problem of determining jurisdiction
over non-segregated funds, i.e., general debts owed to the debtor or
his accounts receivable. Traditionally, such controversies have been
outside the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. "7 Under a "substantial
proprietary interest" test, jurisdiction could be found if the actual
unsegregated money held by the debtor was deemed the "property
in controversy," or if the contract which gave rise to the debt was
deemed such property. The initial question is whether the debt or
account is "property" within the meaning of "property of the
debtor" language of section 311. Either construction suggested
above would be arguably within this language. However, whether
the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction should more properly turn
upon a determination by the bankruptcy court, of whether proceeds
of the debt or account are "reasonably necessary to the successful
formulation, confirmation, and performance of a plan of arrange-
ment." Such a decision would be within the court's sound discretion
and based upon its working knowledge of the debtor's affairs.
It should be noted that under the ownership tests proposed by
Collier and the courts,'78 there is a critical date on which ownership
176. 327 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1964) discussed in text accompanying notes 55-60 supra.
177. See Willyerd v. Buildex Co., 463 F.2d 996 (6th Cir. 1972) and cases cited therein.
178. See 8 COLLIMR T 3.02 n.2 at 157.
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is determined: the date of filing the chapter XI petition. If the
debtor does not have ownership at that time, no summary jurisdic-
tion based on ownership would exist.'79 Commentators have ques-
tioned why such a crucial matter is determined in so many cases
merely by the date the petition was filed."0
Property that is reasonably necessary to the debtor's plan
should be within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court irrespec-
tive of when the chapter XI proceedings were filed. This should hold
true whether it is the debtor's interest in the property or the prop-
erty itself which comes into existence subsequent to the date of
filing. This becomes ever more plausible when the property, or the
debtor's interest comes into existence after filing but before a plan
is formulated. The "reasonably necessary" rule seems to make more
sense than the filing date cut-off, given the fact that one of the
purposes of chapter XI is to allow the debtor to continue the opera-
tion of his business under court supervision."'
In Kapelus v. A Joint Venture, 2 the debtor ostensibly trans-
ferred a parcel of realty to two creditors but retained an option to
repurchase for an amount far below the value of the property. The
bankruptcy court in that case was of the opinion that the transfer-
repurchase agreement was, in substance, a mortgage, and therefore
was property of the debtor subject to the summary jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court.
Although in Kapelus the debtor was in possession of the prop-
erty, it is interesting to speculate as to how other tests might apply
if the debtor was not in possession. Under a "title" test, no jurisdic-
tion would exist since the debtor did not have title. Collier's "owner-
ship" test would not be applicable since the creditors did have a
deed for the property and did have a valid claim against the debtor
which could have been consideration for the transfer. Thus, there
was at least an "adverse claim of ownership" by the creditors which
179. This "at the time of filing" rule is apparently a mirror image of the rule of the
possession test which is based on the concept that at the time of filing all the debtor's interest
in his property passes to the trustee and is therefore in custodia legis and that the court may
always protect its own possession. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 481
(1940); In re Eakin, 154 F.2d 717, 719 (2d Cir. 1946). But note that the substantial proprietary
interest test is not based on any concept of possession and so the "at the time of filing" rule
need not apply.
180. See Broude, Jurisdiction and Venue Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1973, 48 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 231, 234 (1974).
181. See United States Metal Prods. Co. v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D.N.Y.
1969). In support of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over property in which the debtor
acquires an interest after filing, but which is reasonably related to the debtor's plan see
Festersen, supra note 167, at 347.
182. 377 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1967).
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would defeat summary jurisdiction.' 3 Even if the creditors admitted
that although their deed was for the entire parcel, their interest in
the land was only for an amount equal to their claims against the
debtor, this would result in the debtor having undisputed ownership
of only a portion of the realty-perhaps an undetermined physical
amount of acreage or even an undivided interest in the whole parcel.
Neither Collier nor the courts which have discussed an "ownership"
theory specifically address the question of how much ownership is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the whole property. Under a
"substantial proprietary interest" test, it would be a simple matter
to determine, under the facts of Kapelus at least, that the debtor
did have such an interest in the property.
Another illustrative case is In re Copeland,"4 where the debtor
had pledged stock to secure his obligation as a guarantor on a note.
That case suggests a potential problem of bankruptcy courts im-
pairing the rights of secured creditors which is clearly beyond the
intended scope of chapter XI. However, in Copeland the debtor did
not seek to force a composition plan on a secured creditor, but rather
sought to have the bankruptcy court determine whether the creditor
had an attached and perfected security interest at all. In addition,
the debtor sought an order from the bankruptcy court directing the
escrow agent holding the stock to turn it over to the bankruptcy
court. Such an order and determination seems to be within the
intended scope of chapter XI.'1 Thus, where the bankruptcy court
does not attempt to impair a creditor's security or reduce the debt
as part of the plan of arrangement, the mere fact that the bank-
ruptcy court proposes to enter orders dealing with secured creditors
would not put such orders outside the real purposes of chapter XI
or the "substantial proprietary interest" test.
Although it has been suggested elsewhere "' that an expansion
of the current jurisdictional standard would not be desirable since
it would create uncertainty and hence promote litigation, it seems
that there is no shortage of uncertainty today. Furthermore, an
expansion of jurisdiction based upon "substantial proprietary inter-
est" criteria would be sufficiently broad to eliminate much of the
present litigation over the existence of constructive possession and
183. Collier's position is that for an adverse claim of ownership to defeat jurisdiction, it
must be made by one in possession of the property. 8 COLLIER 3.02 (text preceding n.13 at
162-63). The courts have not picked up this point in their application of Collier's rule. For
discussion of this subject see notes 82 and 101 supra.
184. 391 F. Supp. 134 (D. Del. 1975).
185. See text accompanying notes 157 and 170 supra.
186. Comment, supra note 17, at 1408.
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"substantial adverse claims."'' 7 Such an expansion could also be
worked within the existing Act.
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
On July 24, 1970, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States was created to study the nation's existing bank-
ruptcy laws and to recommend improvements to effect a more just
and efficient bankruptcy procedure.' On July 1, 1973, the Commis-
sion filed its report"9 which consists of two principal parts. Part I is
an analysis and evaluation of the present system of bankruptcy
administration and the Commission's textual recommendations for
changes therein. Part II consists of actual proposed statutory
changes comprising a new "Bankruptcy Act of 1973," along with
official comments modeled in the form of such acts as the Uniform
Commercial Code.
During the formulation of the Commission's proposals, the
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges created a committee to
monitor the work of the Commission, and to make recommenda-
tions concerning the Commission's final product. The committee,
while agreeing in many respects with provisions of the Commission's
bill, differed in its recommendations on other important aspects of
the proposed legislation. In view of the number of important differ-
ences, the Conference committee decided to draft its own bill.
Both the Commission and Conference bills were introduced
into the 93rd Congress, 9 ' and reintroduced into the 94th Congress. 9'
The Senate Judiciary Committee began hearings on both reintro-
duced bills on February 19, 1975.192 The House Judiciary Commit-
tee began hearings on both bills on May 7, 1975. I11 Representatives
of both the Commission and the Conference have been called to
187. Id. at 1408 n.70.
188. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468. The term was extended on
two occasions: Act of March 10, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-251, 86 Stat. 63; Act of July 1, 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-56, 87 Stat. 140.
189. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. Parts 1&2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION
REPORT).
190. The Commission bill was introduced as H.R. 10792 and S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973). The Conference bill was introduced as H.R. 16643 and S. 4046, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974).
191. The Commission bill was reintroduced as H.R. 31 and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975). The Conference bill was reintroduced as H.R. 32 and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975).
192. 1 CCH CONGRESSIONAL INDEX 94th Cong. at 2503.
193. 2 CCH CONGRESSIONAL INDEX 94th Cong. at 5051.
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testify .,11 However, as of July 1976, neither bill had been reported
out of committee.
9 5
Although two bills are thus pending in the Congress, the juris-
dictional sections of both are identical." ' Thus, reference to the
Commission bill, which, unlike the Conference bill, is supplemented
with an extensive report'97 discussing the justification for its statu-
tory recommendations, will be sufficient to explore the effect of
pending legislation on the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction.
It should be pointed out, however, that the Commission bill
would consolidate chapters X, XI, and XII into one new chapter
(chapter VII).'11 The Conference bill would consolidate only chap-
ters XI and XII (into chapter VIII) maintaining a separate chapter
194. Drake, supra note 155, at 1010. See Hearings on S. 235 and 236 Before the Subcom.
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1975).
195. No indication of further Congressional action was found as of July, 1976 in CCH
CONGRESSIONAL INDEX.
196. Although the sections describing the scope of jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts are
identical in both bills, the Commission bill calls for the establishment of a United States
Bankruptcy Administration, a full-fledged agency intended to perform administrative tasks
such as: (1) the receipt and handling of voluntary petitions; (2) the issuance of notices to
creditors; (3) the allowance and disallowance of exemptions; (4) the allowance and disallow-
ance of claims; (5) the granting of discharges when no objections are filed; (6) the approval
of the rejection of executory contracts of debtors; (7) the determination of priority of distribu-
tion of proceeds; and (8) the ordering of the payment of dividends. COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 189, part 1 at 117-21. Although no clear statement of the scope of the agency's power is
offered in the Commission's bill, as opposed to the Commission's report, it appears that the
statement of bankruptcy court's jurisdiction in proposed section 2-201 sets the external
boundaries beyond which the agency may not tread.
Still, it has been suggested that this agency/court dichotomy would create a jurisdic-
tional split between the USBA and the bankruptcy courts, much as there presently exists
between summary and plenary adjudication. Lee, A Critical Comparison of the Commission
Bill and the Judges' Bill for the Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 49 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1,
13 (1975). But it has elsewhere been suggested that since the bankruptcy court %Will always
have jurisdiction to hear the dispute, even if it be on appeal, no split really exists. Bull, The
Competing Proposals for a New Bankruptcy Act: Some Substantive Differences in Procedure,
52 J. URBAN L. 929, 934-35 (1975). Although Bull has indicated that, with the exception of
disputed involuntary petitions, all controversies reach bankruptcy court on appeal from the
Administrator's determination, such is not really apparent from the Commission's bill and
report. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 189. Rather it would seem that at least controversies
which manifestly involve actual disputes between parties, and thus on their face call for
judicial and not administrative disposition, are intended to be heard originally by the bank-
ruptcy court. Id., part 2 at 30. Bull's position appears to be a function of a misreading of
comment one to proposed section 2-201 which states merely that the filing of a voluntary
petition does not itself create an issue for the court unless the validity of the petition is first
challenged with the Administrator. Id. at 31-32.
197. COMMISSION REPoir, supra note 189.
198. Id., part 1, at 23. For a discussion of the merits of such consolidation, see Drake,
supra note 155, at 1037.
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for reorganizations (chapter VII).111 Nonetheless, the common juris-
dictional section would apply to all bankruptcy proceedings includ-
ing reorganizations, arrangements, and ordinary bankruptcies as
well.100
Prior to discussing the jurisdictional section itself, it would be
appropriate to summarize the considerations of the Commission
which shaped its statutory proposal. In its report accompanying the
proposed new act, the Commission specifically addressed the issue
of bankruptcy jurisdiction."' The report first lists the situations
where bankruptcy courts may currently exercise their summary ju-
risdiction. It then points out that other controversies must be re-
solved in a non-bankruptcy court although they involve an estate
undergoing administration pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act and
may seriously affect the rights of the debtor and creditors in the
case.
The report goes on to discuss several objectionable results of the
present division of jurisdiction. The first is delay caused not only by
the slower pace of proceedings in nonbankruptcy courts but also by
those courts' more crowded dockets. It is emphasized that delay is
critical in bankruptcy cases, particularly in business debtor rehabil-
itation proceedings.
The division of jurisdiction is an extra expense entailed by the
debtor in litigating outside the bankruptcy court. The report also
recognizes that in some cases conducting litigation in a district
bankruptcy court may be an extra expense to an adverse party.
A serious objection voiced by the report regarding the division
of jurisdiction is the frequent, time-consuming, and expensive liti-
gation of the question whether the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction
of a particular proceeding. It is pointed out that contesting the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, even unsuccessfully, often gives an
adversary the advantages of time and bargaining leverage against
the trustee. It should also be noted that believing bankruptcy courts
are collection-minded, regardless of its truth, may provide further
impetus for some to contest jurisdiction." 2
It is then suggested that a comprehensive grant of jurisdiction
to the bankruptcy court would greatly diminish the basis for litiga-
tion of jurisdictional issues. The report cites, as a step in the direc-
199. In support of the Conference approach, see Weintraub and Crames, Critique of
Chapter VII and Related Sections of the Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973, 48 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 1 (1974).
200. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 189, part 1, at 6.
201. Id. at 88.
202. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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tion of enlarged, comprehensive jurisdiction, the 1970 amendments
to the existing Bankruptcy Act,203 which gave the bankruptcy courts
broad and exclusive jurisdiction over the effect of a discharge on
particular debts. The report also indicates that no constitutional
objection to such a comprehensive jurisdictional grant should
exist. 04
Based on the foregoing considerations, section 2-201 of the pro-
posed Commission bill is a genuinely comprehensive jurisdictional
grant."'o It is important to note that although section 2-201 specifies
203. Act of Oct. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-467, 84 Stat. 990, amending §§ 2a(12), (14),
(15), (17), (38), (58).
204. This conclusion is based not only on the broad language of the Bankruptcy Clause
of the Constitution, but also on the fact that very broad jurisdictional grants were not ob-
jected to under the Bankruptcy Acts of 1841 and 1867, and that under the present Act
virtually any dispute may be heard by the bankruptcy court if the parties consent to such
jurisdiction.
205. The section states in full:
Section 2-201. Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Courts.
(a) Controversies Arising out of a Case. The jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
courts shall extend to the detern'ination of all controversies that arise out of a
case commenced under this Act, including without limitation, the following:
(1) the issues arising on a contest of an involuntary petition;
(2) controversies involving property set apart to the debtor as
exempt, including the enforceability of claims, whether or not se-
cured, against such property;
(3) controversies arising out of agreements for the redemption of
property by the debtor pursuant to this Act from liens securing dis-
chargeable consumer debts;
(4) complaints objecting to the discharge of the debtor, seeking
revocation of a discharge, requesting determination of the effect of a
discharge, and seeking judgment on a debt excepted from discharge;
(5) controversies involving property of the estate of the debtor
without regard to who has possession;
(6) objections to claims, whether secured or not, agains the estate;
(7) actions to avoid payments and transfers of property pursuant
to provisions of this Act;
(8) actions to enforce rights of the debtor or creditors pursuant to
provisions of this Act; and
(9) all other actions in which the trustee or other official under
this Act is a party plaintiff or defendant.
(b) Additional Jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts shall
also extend to determination of the issues and dispositions of
(1) a complaint by a foreign trustee, administrator, or repre-
sentative seeking relief pursuant to section 4-103(b)(3) or (4) in
connection with the administration of a debtor's estate in another
country;
(2) an application for approval of the appointment of a receiver,
a disinterested trustee, a disinterested person selected to perform du-
ties when a trustee ig not appointed, additional committees of credi-
tors, or a committee of equity security holders, and the appropriate-
ness of the removal of any such appointee or change in memberships
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several situations in which jurisdiction is expressly conferred, in-
cluding "controversies involving the property of the estate of the
debtor without regard to who has possession, '"20 subsection (a)(9)
provides a "catch-all" which confers jurisdiction over "all other
actions in which the trustee or other official under this Act is a party
plaintiff or defendant." ' 7 The question of what constitutes property
of the estate, 0 including when such property must be acquired, is
of little practical consequence since jurisdiction will usually exist
under subsection (a) in any event. As the official comments to sec-
tion 2-201 point out,20 9 "This section makes a comprehensive grant
of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts over all varieties of litigable
disputes arising out of a case commenced by the filing of a petition
under this Act . . . ." Thus, with adoption of section 2-201, the
ownership/possession issue would disappear.
of an appointed committee, as provided for in cases under Chapter
VII;
(3) an application for the issuance of certificates of indebtedness
with priority over existing liens as provided for in cases under Chapter
VII;
(4) any application or complaint filed for the purpose of enforcing
the provisions regulating representation of creditors and equity secu-
rity holders in a case under Chapter VII or VIII, including the recovery
of excessive payments for services or the cancellation of obligations
therefor;
(5) an application for authority to sell or lease substantially all
of the property of the debtor in a case under Chapter VII;
(6) an application for the approval, confirmation, rejection or
setting aside of the confirmation of a plan or a modification thereof
under Chapter VII or VIII;
(7) an application for allowance of fees and other expenses of
administration as provided in the Act;
(8) an application for dismissal of a case under Chapter VII; and
(9) an application for determination of any other issue of law or
fact arising in the course of administration of a debtor's estate under
this Act and submitted to the court by the administrator, trustee, or
other party in interest.
(c) Abstention. Nothing in this section precludes the bankruptcy court from
permitting an action, proceeding, or matter within its jurisdiction to be comm-
enced or continued in another court having jurisdiction of the subject matter.
(d) Criminal Cases Excluded; Contempts. The jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
courts shall not extend to the trial of persons charged with offenses against the
laws of the United States. The bankruptcy courts shall nevertheless have
jurisdiction to enforce obedience to their orders by fine or imprisonment or fine
and imprisonment and to punish persons for contempts.
For discussion of the entire section see Broude, supra note 180.
206. H.R. 31 and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2-201(a)(5) (1975).
207. "The term 'official' includes a trustee, receiver, and the administrator." H.R. 31
and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1-102 (33) (1975).
208. Property of the estate of the debtor is defined in the Commission's bill. H.R. 31 and
S.235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-601 (1975).
209. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 189, pt. 2, at 31-32.
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VI. SUMMARY
This article has attempted to make the following points: (1) No
real conflict between Collier and Remington exists upon the scope
of chapter XI jurisdiction; (2) There are no well reasoned or well
supported cases which oppose existence of an alternate "ownership"
based jurisdictional standard; (3) There is no historical justification
for opposing an alternate "ownership" based jurisdictional stan-
dard; (4) The purposes of the current chapter XI proceedings sup-
port an alternate "ownership" based jurisdictional standard; (5) An
"ownership" standard, if widely adopted, needs more specific defi-
nition than exists in present case law and secondary authority; (6)
A "substantial proprietary interest" test, as described in this
comment, might be an acceptable alternate jurisdictional standard;
(7) The proposed bankruptcy legislation and accompanying com-
mentary support an enlargement of jurisdiction beyond a strict
possession test; (8) The adoption of either of the two bills now in
Congress would effect a comprehensive grant of bankruptcy court
jurisdiction and eliminate the present ownership/possession issue.
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